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ABSTRACT

FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH:
BANK CREDIT MATURITY AND
ITS DETERMINANTS
BY
NIKOLA TASIC
December, 2007
Committee Chair:

Dr. Neven T. Valev

Major Department: Economics

This dissertation is an investigation into one of the important functions of the
banking system: to transform short-term liquid deposits into long-term illiquid financial
assets that can fund long gestation activities and, thus, raise the rate of economic growth.
To investigate this function empirically, the dissertation uses two new data sets on the
maturity of bank credit to the private sector. First data set contains yearly observations
covering 74 countries during the period from about 1990 to 2005, while the second data
set contains quarterly observations covering 14 transition countries from about 1995 to
2006.
Using the data on a broad set of countries, the dissertation shows that economic
growth is enhanced in countries where the financial system extends more long-term
credit. This finding is the first empirical confirmation of the theoretical predictions

xii

regarding the liquidity transformation function of banks. Furthermore, using the same
data set, the dissertation shows that credit maturity depends on a number of institutional
and economic factors. The determinants of credit maturity have an impact on economic
growth via their influence on the availability of long-term external financing. Credit
maturity is longer in countries with strong legal institutions, with low inflation, with
deeper financial markets, and with schemes for sharing credit information between
financial institutions. From a policy perspective, the institutions for sharing credit
information probably present the most interest because their establishment is a policy
choice.
Findings from the broad set of countries are confirmed in the second data set
using several definitions of maturity. Additional results from the second data set suggest
that credit maturity is longer in countries at the higher level of economic development,
with less liquid stock markets, and with more privately owned domestic banks.
Furthermore, the results suggest that credit information sharing mechanisms lengthen the
maturity of credit if credit information sharing institutions are privately owned or have
greater quality of information.

xiii

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

The literature on financial development and economic growth has established that
finance has a positive, statistically significant, and economically large causal effect on
economic growth (Beck, Levine, and Loayza 2000; Levine 2005; Wachtel 2001). The
theoretical literature describes five functions of the financial system that can contribute
to this effect. The extent to which the financial system performs these functions well has
clear implications on the rate of economic growth. However, Levine (2005) points to the
main weakness of the empirical literature as having “insufficiently precise link between
theory and measurement.”
In the following chapter we elaborate on this imprecise link and look in more
detail into how one important function of the banking system, liquidity transformation,
relates to the rate of economic growth from a theoretical perspective. We briefly review
Bencivenga and Smith (1991), a paper that derives an insightful model of the economic
growth and provides clear theoretical predictions that more liquid banking system
increases the rate of economic growth. Such banking system transforms short-term liquid
deposits into long-term illiquid financial assets that can fund long gestation activities and,
thus, raise the rate of economic growth. In chapter 3 we provide empirical evidence for
this function using a unique data set that covers 74 countries during the period from about
1990 to 2005. We find that the banking system has a positive effect on economic growth,

1

2
as reported in the previous literature. In addition, we show that the effect is stronger when
the banking system performs its liquidity transformation function well. This finding is the
first empirical confirmation of the theoretical predictions regarding the liquidity
transformation function of banks. This result is obtained using methodology found
elsewhere in the literature, but slightly modified because of data limitations. In particular,
the literature usually investigates the effect of finance on growth by averaging data over 5
years to reduce the impact of business cycles and to concentrate on long-term growth.
However, relatively short time series in most countries required using overlapping
averages and the adjustment of the moving average component in the residuals as
introduced by Newey and West (1987).
Furthermore, in chapter 3 we show that the extent to which the banking system
performs its liquidity provision function depends on a number of financial, economic, and
institutional measures. The major determinants of the liquidity provision function of the
banking sector are rule of law, inflation, the existence of institutions for credit
information sharing, and the size of the financial system. These effects are robust across
various estimation techniques, specifications of the models, alternative institutional
indexes, and different definitions of the credit information sharing.
The data used in chapter 3, despite the coverage of a broad set of countries, have a
limitation that prevents a full investigation of the extent to which the banking system
performs its liquidity transformation function. The main limitation is the definition of
long-term credit as credit with contractual maturity longer than one year. Using a more
detailed data set that covers 14 countries, we partially overcome this limitation in chapter
4. We do that by isolating the portion of credit with contractual maturity of one year or
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less, the portion of credit with contractual maturity longer than one year, and the portion
of credit with contractual maturity longer than five years. Thus, we can investigate shortterm, long-term, and very long-term credit.
We find that most results on the determinants of the portion of credit with
maturity longer than one year obtained in the two chapters are similar. For example, the
rule of law remains a significant determinant of credit maturity and the magnitude of the
estimated coefficients is similar. Similarly, financial deepening is accompanied by
lengthening of the maturity of credit in both samples. Inflation is a much more significant
determinant in a broader set of countries, while per capita GDP growth and stock market
activity are more significant in a smaller set of countries. In addition to the determinants
investigated in a broad set of countries, in a smaller set we also investigate whether state
and foreign ownership of banks influences credit maturity and find that credit maturity is
longer in countries with more privately owned domestic banks. In a smaller set of
countries we also look in more detail at credit information sharing institutions and find
that the quality of information and the ownership structure of such institutions (public vs.
private) have an important impact on maturity.
Overall, this dissertation provides a detailed investigation into one of the
important functions of the banking system: to transform short-term liquid deposits into
long-term illiquid financial assets that can fund long gestation activities and, thus, raise
the rate of economic growth. The dissertation confirms the theoretical predictions and
shows that the availability of long-term credit is particularly important, as economic
growth is faster in countries where the banking system extends more long-term credits.
This is an important missing link between the theoretical and empirical literature on
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financial development and economic growth. Furthermore, the dissertation shows that
credit maturity depends on a number of institutional and economic factors. These factors
also influence economic growth through their impact on credit maturity.

CHAPTER TWO
CREDIT MATURITY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH:
A CONCISE LITERATURE REVIEW

A large theoretical and empirical literature on financial development and
economic growth has established that finance has a positive, statistically significant, and
economically large causal effect on economic growth and its sources (Levine 2005).
Theoretically, this effect arises through several channels which are summarized by
Levine (2005) in five categories. The financial system increases the rate of economic
growth as it: (1) produces information ex ante about possible investments and allocates
capital, (2) monitors investments and exerts corporate governance after providing
finance, (3) facilitates the trading, diversification, and management of risk, (4) mobilizes
and pools savings, and (5) eases the exchange of goods and services. In essence, financial
development can be defined as the extent to which the financial system performs these
functions well.
King and Levine (1993) note that in the view of economist like Goldsmith (1969),
McKinnon (1973), and Shaw (1973) “differences in the quantity and quality of services
provided by financial institutions could partly explain why countries grow at different
rates.” However, the empirical literature that investigates the growth effects of bank
lending has focused only on the quantity of services rather than on quality of the services
provided by the banking sector. The literature has relied on the assumption made by
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Goldsmith (1969) that the size of the financial system is a good measure of the quantity
and quality of functions the financial system provides. Levine (2005) recognizes that
even
The organization of the empirical evidence advertises an important
weakness in the finance and growth literature: there is frequently an insufficiently
precise link between theory and measurement. Theory focuses on particular
functions provided by the financial sector, [while the empirical literature] pertains
to the proxies for financial development. (Levine 2005)
Furthermore, Beck and Levine (2004) note that ideally, researchers would
construct a cross-country measure of how well banks perform their activities. The authors
also note that “economists, however, have not been able to accurately measure these
financial services … [and] consequently, researchers traditionally use measures of the
overall size of the banking sector.” Levine (1999) notes that
Ideally one would like to construct measures of the particular functions
provided by the financial system. That is, one would like to have a comparative
measure of the ability of the financial system to reach firms and identify
profitable ventures, exert corporate control, manage risk, mobilize savings, and
ease transactions. Accurately measuring the provision of these services in any
single country would be extraordinarily difficult; doing it for a broad crosssection of countries would be virtually impossible. (Levine 1999)
This dissertation contributes in that direction by exploring one of the channels
through which financial development enhances economic growth–liquidity provision and
liquidity risk amelioration. In particular, the dissertation provides empirical evidence for
the liquidity transformation function performed by banks, which is a part of the third
function in Levine’s categorization described above. The dissertation shows that the
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effect of banking sector activity on economic growth depends on the liquidity
transformation function performed by banks. In addition, the dissertation explains what
factors determine the extent to which the banking system performs liquidity
transformation, and looks into how these factors in turn influence the rate of economic
growth. Before turning to the empirical evidence and to the literature on the determinants
of liquidity transformation, in the remainder of this chapter we review the theoretical
literature relating the liquidity transformation function of banks to the rate of economic
growth. This review will help in formulating the empirical hypothesis about this
relationship.
Levine (1997) defines liquidity as “the ease and speed with which agents can
convert assets into purchasing power at agreed prices” and liquidity risk as the risk that
“arises due to the uncertainties associated with converting assets into a medium of
exchange.” Liquidity may be inhibited by various informational asymmetries as well as
transaction costs and financial intermediaries and markets arise to ameliorate these
problems. Levine explains that a system which properly provides liquidity will leave little
uncertainty about the timing and settlement of contracts, and contracts will be
inexpensive to trade.
Furthermore, Levine (1997; 2005) explains that economic growth is closely
linked to the liquidity provision function of the financial system. The link arises “because
some high-return projects require a long commitment of capital, but savers do not like to
relinquish control of their savings for long periods.” Therefore, the financial system plays
a key role as it makes individual savers’ funds more liquid, while it invests a portion of
the funds into illiquid long-term investments.
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Levine (1997) draws on the historical evidence summed by Hicks (1969) to
support this claim. According to Hicks, the improvements of capital markets that
mitigated liquidity risks were the primary causes of the industrial revolution in England.
Individual investors could hold liquid assets but at the same time the financial system
transformed these “liquid financial instruments into long-term capital investments in
illiquid production process.” As England’s industrial revolution required large
commitments to capital for long periods of time, Levine (1997) goes as far as suggesting
that “the industrial revolution may not have occurred without this liquidity
transformation.”
Bencivenga and Smith (1991) formalize these ideas in an insightful model of
economic growth. In their model financial institutions emerge to meet the liquidity needs
of individual economic agents while allocating a higher proportion of the economy’s
savings toward long-term investments compared to the case of financial autarky. The
model adopts the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) framework of an economy populated by
agents who are uncertain about their future liquidity needs at the time they make capital
allocation decisions. This framework is incorporated into a growth model featuring
capital investment externalities where production depends on firms’ individual capital
levels as well as the societal capital level, as in Romer (1986). Economic growth is
enhanced by the presence of financial institutions since they allocate a greater proportion
of the economy’s savings to long-term, high productivity projects.
In particular, there are two savings assets: one is a liquid asset that matures earlier
but returns less of the consumption good than an illiquid asset. The higher return on the
illiquid asset captures the idea of the slow production cycle of high productivity

9
investments, as well as the long gestation periods in capital production, as discussed by
Böhm-Bawerk (1891), Cameron (1967), and Kydland and Prescott (1982). However, if
the illiquid asset is liquidated before it matures, the liquidation value is lower than the
return on the liquid asset.
Individuals’ preferences over consumption are modeled as in Diamond and
Dybvig (1983) so that agents may experience a liquidity need in any period with some
probability. If agents have invested a portion of their savings in the long-term assets and
are faced with such liquidity need, agents liquidate their holdings of the long-term asset.
They consume the amount available after liquidation, plus the proceeds from their shortterm investments. Consumption is lower compared to the case when the entire savings are
allocated to the low-return but liquid asset (i.e.,, short-term investments).
In this environment, agents invest a large proportion of their savings in the liquid
asset reducing the funds available for the high productivity illiquid capital. Financial
institutions emerge as a group of individual investors who pool their savings. The
financial institution can meet the liquidity needs of its individual members by keeping
reserves invested in the liquid asset. However, the financial institutions can keep a
smaller fraction of the total savings in liquid assets compared to the case of financial
autarky when individual agents allocate their savings between liquid and illiquid assets.
By the law of large numbers, the need for liquidity is predictable on the aggregate level
so the financial institution can keep reserves only in the amount necessary to meet that
aggregate liquidity need. Therefore, with financial institutions, a greater portion of the
savings is allocated to the long-term illiquid assets raising economic growth.
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This is only a simplified and concise explanation of the results in Bencivenga and
Smith (1991), as the paper pursues a number of additional avenues and provides
additional interesting results. When savings are allowed to vary with or without banks,
we see that the theoretical results are ambiguous. As the income and substitution effects
are working in the opposite direction, increased liquidity risk amelioration may decrease
savings. Jappelli and Pagano (1994) show that increasing liquidity can cause saving rates
to fall enough to decrease equilibrium growth. Even when savings fall with the presence
of financial intermediaries, the overall effect on growth can be positive if the
intermediaries devote a higher portion of (smaller) savings to long-term credit, i.e., if
long-term credit is greater under intermediaries than under autarky, despite overall credit
being higher under autarky. In addition, empirical results that look at the impact of
financial intermediation on savings have shown that financial intermediation has little or
no impact on savings rates. Therefore, the assumption of financial intermediaries having
no impact on savings is in line with the empirical work that shows no economically
strong and statistically significant impact.
Building on Bencivenga and Smith (1991), Greenwood and Smith (1997) show
that the financial intermediation provided by banks is necessarily growth enhancing,
while in the original model it was growth enhancing under some weak assumptions.
Furthermore, Greenwood and Smith (1997) draw on Hicks (1969) and North (1981) to
note that “new technologies could be employed only by ‘tying up’ large-scale
investments in illiquid capital for long period.” By providing liquidity in an effective way
the financial sector can promote investment in innovation, capital accumulation, and
growth.
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Noting that production processes can take a long time, be uncertain, and subject to
shocks, Holmstrom and Triole (1998) argue that access to credit during production
reduces the risk of premature liquidation and increases the incentives for investing in
longer gestation, higher-return projects. Their model, however, does not provide a formal
link between liquidity provision and economic growth as in Bencivenga and Smith
(1991). In contrast, Aghion et al. (2005) show that innovation and long-run growth will
be enhanced in an economy that experiences macroeconomic shocks but firms have
access to credit during the entire production process. Their predictions are confirmed
empirically by showing that financial development reduces the adverse growth effects of
macroeconomic volatility. However, they do not investigate data on the maturity of
credits.
Despite the convincing arguments discussed above, the notion that long-term
credit is good for growth is not universally accepted. Sissoko (2006) combines the
monetary and the financial role of intermediaries into a growth model with the division of
labor. The model allows agents to buy and sell a cash-in-advance constraint which gives
rise to growth enhancing short-term credit. The model predicts that short-term credit
increases growth, but the author does not tests this prediction for “lack of data on credit
maturity.”
Other theoretical work where short-term lending is growth-enhancing is the
signaling framework of Flannery (1986): firms that are not concerned with reevaluation
by the credit markets (good firms) will borrow short-term, while firms that fear
reevaluation (bad firms) will want to borrow long-term. Therefore, short-term credit
could have a positive effect on growth as more short-term credit implies more efficient
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investments. However, this holds if there is no direct communication between borrower
and lender, and signaling is the only form of communication.
Still in the signaling framework, Titman (1992) introduces a more realistic setting
(uncertain interest rate and financial distress cost) which leads good firms to a pooling
long-term equilibrium, despite their wish to borrow short-term. Furthermore, Diamond
(1991) shows that the good firms borrow short-term and long-term as this allows them to
extract the benefits of good news while lowering liquidity risk.
There are other theories that argue that long-term credit can increase economic
growth by decreasing the likelihood of financial crises. Ennis and Keister (2003) present
a model where long-term credit is beneficial for both growth and “crisis prevention.” The
authors construct an endogenous growth model where bank runs affect capital stock and
output permanently. Their model is similar to Bencivenga and Smith as the consumers
have similar utility and banks can choose between similar investment opportunities. If
banks keep their portfolio more illiquid, this raises the expected payoff to investors and
induces them to wait until the long-term projects are completed. This lowers the
probability of a run. As a result, the authors note that in their model there is “no tradeoff
between growth and stability… [as] less liquid portfolios bring higher growth with fewer
bank runs.”
In summing the empirical evidence linking liquidity provision and economic
growth, Levine (2005) notes that “isolating this liquidity function from the other financial
functions performed by banks, however, has proven prohibitively difficult.” Because of
this difficulty, research has focused on the effects of liquidity of one security on its price.
Levine notes that, “security-level studies of the relationship between the liquidity of
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individual securities and their prices, however, do not link liquidity with national long
run growth rates.”
Therefore, the empirical evidence is more limited and it focuses only on the
liquidity provision by the stock market, while the literature linking the liquidity
transformation function of banks and credit maturity to economic growth remains
theoretical. This is not surprising as data on credit maturity are not readily available.
Following the arguments in Bencivenga and Smith (1991), we collect cross country data
on maturity of bank credit to the private sector. Bencivenga and Smith (1991) argue that
long-term credit enhances growth. Drawing on this theoretical prediction, the remainder
of this dissertation tests whether this theoretical prediction holds. In addition, we draw on
the previous literature and investigate what factors influence the portion of credit given
out as long-term.

CHAPTER THREE
THE MATURITY STRUCTURE OF BANK CREDIT:
DETERMINANTS AND EFFECTS
ON ECONOMIC GROWTH

The literature on financial development and economic growth has established that
finance has a positive, statistically significant, and economically large causal effect on
economic growth (2005). There is, however, much less empirical evidence on the
channels through which this positive effect is obtained. Levine (2005) points out that
even the organization of the empirical evidence advertises an important weakness in the
finance and growth literature: there is frequently an insufficiently precise link between
theory and measurement: ”theory focuses on particular functions provided by the
financial sector, [while the empirical literature] pertains to the proxies for financial
development.”
As discussed in the previous chapter, transforming liquid savings into illiquid
assets that can fund long-term investment projects is one of the important functions of the
financial system. Levine (1997) explains that economic growth is closely linked to the
maturity transformation function of the financial system, as high-return projects require a
long commitment of capital but savers do not like to relinquish control of their savings
for long periods. The financial system plays a key role in preserving the liquidity of
savings of individual savers while investing a portion of the funds into illiquid long-term
projects. Historical evidence supports this claim. According to Hicks (1969), the capital
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market improvements that mitigated liquidity risks were the primary cause of England’s
industrial revolution as individual investors could hold liquid assets but at the same time
the financial system transformed these liquid financial instruments into long-term capital
investments. As England’s industrial revolution required large commitments of capital
for long periods, Levine (1997) goes as far as noting that the industrial revolution may
not have occurred without this liquidity transformation.
Our objective is to provide empirical evidence for that function of the financial
system. For that purpose we collect and analyze a unique data set on the maturity of
domestic credit to the private sector in 74 countries during the period from about 1990 to
2005. We ask two broad questions. First, what factors determine the differences in credit
maturity across countries? For example, only 24 percent of domestic private credit in
Mali has maturity longer than 1 year, whereas in Hungary 75 percent of credit has
maturity longer than 1 year. What explains that difference? Second, we investigate
whether the effect of private credit on economic growth depends on the maturity of
credit. Theory suggests that credit will be more effective in terms of raising economic
growth when the financial system performs better its maturity transformation function.
Bencivenga and Smith (1991) develop an insightful model that formalizes the
relationship between the maturity transformation role of banks and economic growth.
There are two savings assets in the model: a liquid asset that matures early but returns
less of the consumption good and an illiquid asset that has a higher (but later) payoff.1 If
liquidated before it matures, the illiquid asset returns less than the liquid asset. Following
Diamond and Dybvig (1983), individuals are uncertain about their future liquidity needs
1

The higher return on the illiquid asset captures the idea of the slow production cycle of high productivity
investments, as well as the long gestation periods in capital production, as discussed by Böhm-Bawerk
(1891), Cameron (1967), and Kydland and Prescott (1982).
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at the time they make capital allocation decisions and therefore they invest most of their
savings into the liquid low-return asset. Financial institutions emerge as groups of
individuals who pool their savings, keep a portion of the pooled savings in liquid assets to
meet the liquidity needs of its members, and invest the remaining amounts in illiquid
high-return project. Thus, the proportion of society’s savings that are invested in projects
with high productivity increases and this enhances economic growth.2
In Bencivenga and Smith, economic growth increases in the proportion of savings
invested in long-term assets. We provide empirical evidence in support of this hypothesis.
We show that the effect of private credit on economic growth is stronger when a larger
fraction of private credit has long-term maturity. Our empirical evidence fits well with
papers showing that the effect of finance on growth depends on the economic and
institutional environment of a country. For example, Rousseau and Wachtel (2002), Choi,
Smith, and Boyd (1996), Haslag and Koo (1999), Khan and Senhadji (2000), and Boyd,
Levine and Smith (2001) show that the effect of credit on growth is diminished in high
inflation countries. It is, however, not clear what function of the financial system is
blocked in high inflation environments. Our results suggest that credit has a smaller effect
on growth (at least partly) because the financial system shifts resources toward shortterm, less productive assets.

2

The notion that long-term lending enhances growth is not universally accepted. Sissoko (2006) combines
the monetary and the financial role of intermediaries into a growth model where agents can buy and sell a
cash-in-advance constraint. This gives rise to growth enhancing short-term credit, but the author does not
test this prediction for lack of data on credit maturity. Also, in Flannery (1986) firms that are not concerned
about reevaluation by the credit markets (good firms) will borrow short-term, while firms that fear
reevaluation (bad firms) will want to borrow long-term. Therefore, short-term credit could have a positive
effect on growth as more short-term credit implies more efficient investments. However, the more realistic
setting of Titman (1992) with uncertain interest rate and financial distress costs motivates good firms to use
long-term credit despite the lower contractual cost on short-term debt. Diamond (1991) also shows that
good firms borrow short- and long-term to extract the benefits of good news while lowering liquidity risk.
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Before we present that evidence, in order to become more familiar with credit
maturity, we investigate its determinants by testing a number of empirical hypotheses
drawn from the literature. The data show that credit maturity varies substantially across
countries, even if the countries have a similar level of financial and economic
development. We show that credit maturity is shorter in countries with lax rule of law,
high inflation, less developed financial markets, and greater economic volatility.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. We describe the data in the
following section. Section 2 draws empirical hypotheses from the literature and
investigates the determinants of credit maturity. Section 3 present results for the effect of
credit maturity on economic growth and section 4 concludes.

Data on credit maturity
We use data on lending by banks to the private sector in 74 countries spanning the
period from about 1990 to 2005, depending on data availability for the individual
countries. The data were collected from a variety of sources including publications by
central banks and multilateral organizations. Table 1 provides variable definitions and
details the sources of the data. The sample includes all countries for which we could
identify a consistent data source. The summary statistics of our private credit variable,
shown in Table 2, match closely those from the widely used World Bank data set on
financial structure (see Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine 2000) for the entire sample and
for each individual country. However, because our sample spans only more recent years,
the summary statistics reveal a higher level of financial development compared to the
World Bank data that begin in 1960.
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Table 1. Variable Definitions and Sources
Variable
Credit / GDP

Long-Term
Credit / GDP

Short-Term
Credit / GDP

Percent LongTerm Credit

Real per capita
GDP Growth

Definition
Sources
Central Bank of West African States:
Credit by deposit money banks and
other financial institutions to the private Benin, Burkina, Guinea Bissau, Ivory
Coast, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and
sector divided by GDP.
Togo; Economic and Monetary
Long-Term Credit is credit by deposit
Community of Central Africa:
money banks and other financial
institutions to the private sector with the Cameroon, Central African R., Chad,
Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon;
original contractual maturity longer
Eurostat: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus,
than one year divided by GDP.
Czech R.*, Denmark, Finland,
Short-Term Credit is credit by deposit
France*, Greece*, the Netherlands*,
money banks and other financial
Norway, Poland*, Spain, and
institutions to the private sector with the Sweden; and FDIC Statistics on
original contractual maturity of one
Depository Institutions for the United
year or less divided by GDP.
States. For the remaining countries
(and as second source for countries
Credit with an original contractual
maturity longer than one year divided with * above) source was
corresponding central bank (official
by credit.
publications and website).
The percent increase in real per capita
GDP from the previous year.

Per Capita GDP The real per capita GDP in US dollars.

International Financial Statistics (IFS)
database of International Monetary
Fund (IMF). In some cases data were
retrieved from Eurostat database and
Euromonitor International's World
Marketing Data and Statistics (Plus)
which uses IMF’s World Economic
Outlook, United Nations, as well as
national statistics in addition to IFS.

Inflation

The increase in the annual CPI.

Trade / GDP

Sum of imports and exports of goods
and services as a share of GDP.

Gov. / GDP

General government consumption as
share of GDP.

Rule of Law

Index that measures “the extent to which
World Bank data set “Governance
agents have confidence in and abide by
Matters VI” by Kaufmann, Kraay,
the rules of society, and in particular the
and Mastruzzi (2007).
quality of contract enforcement.”

Banking
The assets of three largest banks as a
World Bank data set “A new database
Industry Conc. share of assets of all commercial banks.
on financial development and
Stock Market
Stock market volume traded during a
structure” by Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt,
Turnover Ratio year divided by the stock market
and Levine (2000).
capitalization at the end of the year.
Credit
Information
Sharing

Dummy variable: 1 if public credit
registry or private credit bureau
operates in a country during a year, 0
otherwise.

Manuf. Share of Value added by manufacturing divided
Output
by total value added.

Author constructed from Djankov,
McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007), Miller
(2003), and Brown, Japelli, and
Pagano (2007).
United Nations’ National Accounts
Main Aggregates Database.

Output Volatility Root mean squared errors from Growtht
Author constructed from data on Real
= α + εt, using data from the preceding
per capita GDP Growth.
10 years.

2.98
13.69
-12.81
3.8
659

1.00*
0.57*
0.61*
-0.12*
0.32*
0.20*
0.72*
-0.05*
0.07*
0.17*
-0.46*
0.31*

1.00*
-0.07*
0.13*

-0.08*
-0.25*
-0.04*
0.16*
-0.10*
-0.12*
-0.08*
-0.04*

0.25*
0.10*

53.04
206.61
0
44.7
659

-0.32*
0.26*

0.45*
-0.16*
0.32*
0.18*
0.61*
-0.02*
0.04*
0.09*

1.00*

54.14
99.32
1.51
24.35
659

-0.41*
0.11*

1.00*
-0.13*
0.37*
0.17*
0.85*
-0.10*
0.09*
0.11*
0.07*
0.02*

1.00*
-0.06*
-0.03*
-0.13*
0.05*
-0.09*
-0.17*

9,676
11.82
52,228 1,058.37
82
-9.62
10,943
55.24
659
652

Per
Capita
GDP Inflation

-0.28*
0.12*

1.00*
0.05*
0.50*
0.08*
0.11*
0.07*

16.55
30.68
3.91
5.47
653

Gov. /
GDP

0.11*
0.20*

1.00*
0.25*
-0.10*
-0.13*
-0.20*

90.67
321.7
23.33
44.76
637

Trade /
GDP

-0.52*
0.35*

1.00*
0.00*
0.05*
0.20*

0.33
2.12
-1.94
1.05
510

0.03*
-0.15*

1.00*
0.03*
-0.06*

0.72
1
0.24
0.2
528

-0.14*
0.04*

1.00*
0.14*

0.63
16.02
0
1.06
403

-0.38*
-0.02*

1.00*

0.64
1
0
0.48
659

1.00*
-0.00*

4.32
21.78
0.56
3.73
554

1.00*

4.32
21.78
0.56
3.73
554

Stock
Banking Market Credit
Manuf.
Rule of Industry Turnover Info.
Output Share of
Law
Ratio Sharing Volatility Output
Conc.

Notes: * indicates statistical significance at the 5 percent level. See Table 1 for variable definitions.

Growth
Credit / GDP
Percent LongTerm Credit
Per Capita GDP
Inflation
Gov. / GDP
Trade / GDP
Rule of Law
Bank. Ind. Conc.
Stock Mkt. TOR
Credit Info.
Sharing
Output Volatility
Manuf. Share of
Output

Panel B: Correlations

Mean
Maximum
Minimum
Std. Dev.
Observations

Panel A: Descriptive Statistics

Percent
Real per
Longcapita
GDP Credit / Term
Credit
Growth GDP

Table 2. Summary Statistics
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Credit is decomposed into two categories: short-term credit that has contractual
maturity of one year or less and long-term credit that has contractual maturity longer than
one year. Some countries, most notably many of the transition economies, provide more
detailed data on credit maturity–up to one year, one to five years and longer than 5 years.
Some countries report maturity longer than 7 or even 15 years. While it would be
interesting to investigate credit with different maturity structures (e.g., medium-term,
long-term, and “very long-term” credit), the only categorization that is consistent across
all countries is the one that divides credit into short-term credit with maturity of one year
or less and other credits. Therefore, we proceed with this definition of short-term and
long-term debt but we also explore other maturity structures in the following chapter with
a smaller sample.
Table 3 shows large differences in terms of financial development measured as
private credit as percent of GDP. For example, in Albania, Azerbaijan, Chad and several
other countries, private credit is below 10 percent of GDP whereas in Ireland, the
Netherlands, Portugal, Taiwan and several other countries it is well over 100 percent of
GDP. Table 4, which reports the credit averages for three groups of countries based on
income, shows that private bank credit has the lowest level in low income countries
(25.01 percent of GDP), compared to middle income countries (58.31 percent of GDP)
and high income countries (93.81 percent of GDP).
On average, 54.14 percent of bank credit to the private sector has long-term
maturity. There are, however, large differences between countries. Long-term credit is
less than 30 percent of total credit in a number of countries including Bangladesh, The
Central African Republic, Niger and Lesotho and it is greater than 70 percent of total

5.72
2.99 2.73
34.47 21.86 12.61
115.33 86.88 28.45
0.08
0.02 0.06
69.18 62.74 6.44
38.98
5.47 33.5
101.5 67.62 33.88
13.4
3.94 9.46
36.84 27.12 9.72
39.75 28.98 10.77
19.13
14 5.12
13.55
4.14 9.41
10.27
2.91 7.36
6.88
0.59 6.29
5.82
0.62
5.2
106.76 38.89 67.87
11.11
1.13 9.98
199.09 184.72 14.37
49.27
31.4 17.86
23.54 10.03 13.51
2.78
0.58
2.2
41.37
36 5.37
81.66 74.34 7.32
86.22 72.98 13.24
12.41
5.41 7.01

45.79
63.41
75.28
25.44
90.6
14.01
66.86
29.36
73.77
72.56
68.09
30.39
28.31
8.76
11.45
36.24
21.4
92.77
65.02
40.98
21.42
82.52
91.05
84.64
43.66

Short- Percent
Term LongCredit Term
/ GDP Credit

Georgia
Germany
Greece
Guinea Bissau
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Ivory Coast
Jordan
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyz Rep.
Latvia
Lesotho
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Macau
Macedonia
Malaysia
Mali
Mongolia
Mozambique
Netherlands
Nicaragua
Niger

Country

35.08
82.82
49.18
14.21
75.41
35.28
77.41
52.66
25.1
33.74
49.13
13.9
65.21
21.76
58.21
59.87
61.77
46.36
47.83
24.24
20.65
44.05
74.37
53.81
23.26

Short- Percent
Term LongCredit Term
/ GDP Credit

8.16
3.73 4.44
95.36 79.18 16.18
49.15 24.83 24.33
2.22
0.38 1.84
72.23 54.87 17.36
92.66 31.92 60.75
119.13
93.2 25.93
73.88 39.29 34.59
14.01
3.52 10.49
79.9 27.23 52.67
16.3
9.84 6.46
2.31
0.34 1.97
28.44 21.68 6.77
8.28
2.29 5.99
17.95 11.66 6.29
97.36 58.24 39.12
65.17 39.89 25.28
13.03
6.56 6.47
126.31 60.04 66.27
19.23
4.67 14.55
23.7
5.39 18.31
14.19
6.12 8.07
134.8 100.64 34.16
24.04 12.92 11.12
5.95
1.42 4.54

LongTerm
Credit / Credit /
GDP
GDP

Notes: Presented are country averages for the available years. See Table 1 for variable definitions.

Albania
Armenia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Bahamas, The
Bangladesh
Belgium
Benin
Bolivia
Bosnia&Herzegov.
Bulgaria
Burkina
Cameroon
Cent. African Rep.
Chad
China
Congo
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
Equatorial Guinea
Estonia
Finland
France
Gabon

Country

LongTerm
Credit / Credit /
GDP
GDP

34.88 18.16 54.14

53.04

Sample

Short- Percent
Term LongCredit Term
/GDP Credit

77.45 66.99 10.45 86.44
15.32
9.09 6.23 59.41
126.82 91.98 34.84 69.32
16.48
5.99 10.49 34.9
14.22
6.51
7.7 47.59
29.46 10.09 19.37 33.12
19.69
7.26 12.43
37
56.97 14.86 42.11 31.44
66.34 41.59 24.75 60.9
25.76 17.36 8.39 67.26
28.02 17.02
11 59.68
91.64 71.33 20.31 77.31
25.07 10.11 14.96 40.2
112.06 109.18 2.88 97.45
143.59 99.66 43.93 69.37
14.97
6.13 8.83 41.47
65.34 30.35 34.99 46.35
57.23 52.59 4.64 91.62
7.07
3.72 3.35 27.36
62.24 27.58 34.66 44.01
58.8 32.16 26.64 52.16
5.08
0.28 4.81 5.53

LongTerm
Credit / Credit /
GDP
GDP

Norway
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Russia
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
Serbia, Rep.
Singapore
Slovak Rep.
Slovenia
Spain
Sri Lanka
Sweden
Taiwan
Togo
Tunisia
Turkey
Ukraine
United States
Uruguay
Yemen

Country

Table 3. Country Averages of Credit and Credit Maturity
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credit in Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Norway, and several other countries. Table 4 shows
that there are systematic differences in credit maturity between countries at different
levels of economic and financial development. In low income countries, the percent longterm credit is 40.38 percent, whereas in middle income and high income countries it is,
respectively, 63.17 percent and 72.39 percent. More developed economies have more
private credit and, also, a greater portion of their credits have long-term maturity.
However, notice in Table 2 that the correlation coefficient of the level of credit and credit
maturity is not very large in magnitude (0.57), i.e., credit maturity can differ across
countries with the same levels of financial development. For example, credit is about 95
percent of GDP in Germany and Belgium. However, the percent long-term credit is about
83 percent in Germany and about 66 percent in Belgium. Also, private credit is about 40
percent of GDP in both Bangladesh and Estonia. However, in Estonia long-term credit is
about 83 percent of total credit and in Bangladesh it is only about 14 percent of total
credit.

Table 4. Income and Bank Credit Maturity
Real per
Long-Term
Percent
Short-Term Long-Term
capita GDP
Credit /
Credit / GDP
Growth Credit / GDP
GDP
Credit
Low income countries

2.64

25.01

12.08

12.93

40.38

Middle income countries

3.04

58.31

39.91

18.40

63.17

High income countries

2.20

93.81

69.16

24.65

72.39

Notes: Presented are the average values for each variable for three income groups defined as low
income if per capita GDP is below $1,715, middle income if it is between $1,715 and $10,800,
and as high income if it is above $10,800. See Table 1 for variable definitions.
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The determinants of credit maturity
Building on Modigliani and Miller (1958), Stiglitz (1974) shows that in a perfect
world the maturity of credit, as any other financing decision, is irrelevant. Subsequent
research has added transaction costs, informational asymmetries, liquidation costs, and
taxes to that framework as a result of which maturity becomes an important factor in
financing decisions. There is a large empirical literature on the determinants of credit
maturity from individual (mostly industrialized) countries reviewed by Ravid (1996).
In terms of cross country evidence, Qian and Strahan (2007) and Demirgüç-Kunt
and Maksimovic (1999) investigate the determinants of credit maturity in samples of,
respectively, 43 and 30 countries with a particular focus on the effect of legal institutions.
We stay close to their analysis in terms of the selection of the country-level explanatory
variables but we expand the number of countries substantially and we also include
additional explanatory variables such as economic volatility and banking system
concentration. Furthermore, we use the maturity of bank credit to the entire private
sector whereas Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) and Qian and Strahan (2007)
analyze the borrowing by publicly traded companies only. Using the total private bank
credit allows us to link the results to the finance and growth literature which has used that
variable extensively.

Empirical hypotheses
Legal Institutions
The literature provides substantial evidence that weak legal institutions are a
primary reason for the underdevelopment of financial markets as lenders cannot
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effectively monitor and exert control over borrowers (La Porta et al. 1997; 1998).
Inefficient protection of creditor rights leads to a reduction in the volume of external
financing provided by financial institutions to the private sector. Furthermore, institutions
affect the terms of credits and the maturity of credit in particular. Diamond (1991; 1993)
and Rajan (1992) show that short-term lending facilitates the enforcement of credit
contracts as it limits the period during which an opportunistic firm can exploit its
creditors without being in default. Diamond (2004) argues that “maturity acts as a
substitute contracting tool to control borrower risk,” and that bank loan maturity is
“especially sensitive to the legal environment.” Giannetti (2003) also argues that if the
law does not guarantee creditor rights, lenders would prefer short-term debt to control
entrepreneurs’ opportunistic behavior by using the threat of not renewing their loans. In
line with these theories, we expect to find that weak institutions contribute to shorter
maturity.

High Inflation
Similar to weak institutions, high inflation is detrimental to the development of
the financial system as it limits the amount of external financing available to borrowers
(Huybens and Smith 1998, 1999). Furthermore, similar to institutions, high inflation
affects credit maturity. Boyd, Levine, and Smith (2001) point out that financial
intermediaries are less willing to engage in long-run financial commitments in high
inflation environments. Rousseau and Wachtel (2002) also argue that high inflation will
“discourage any long term financial contracting and financial intermediaries will tend to
maintain very liquid portfolios. In this inflationary environment intermediaries will be
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less eager to provide long-term financing for capital formation and growth.” Therefore,
we expect that high inflation reduces the fraction of credits with long-term maturity.

Stock Market Development
Stock market development has an ambiguous effect on credit maturity. According
to one view, a well functioning stock market could be a substitute source of long-term
financing and would therefore reduce the demand for long-term bank financing. Diamond
(1997) argues that increased participation in markets causes the banking sector to shrink,
primarily through reduced holdings of long-term assets. An alternative view holds that a
developed stock market increases the ability of firms to obtain long-term financing as it
helps reveal information about the borrowers and reduces information asymmetries
(Grossman 1976; Grossman and Stiglitz 1980). Therefore, theoretically the effect of
stock market development on long-term bank financing is ambiguous.

Banking Sector Competition
Banking sector competition can have a dual effect on the provision of external
financing and the provision of long-term financing in particular. A high level of
concentration in the banking sector may raise the cost of funds and thus reduce external
financing (Pagano 1993). Alternatively, high concentration in the banking industry may
foster close relationships between banks and borrowers which reduces information
asymmetries and the cost of monitoring borrowers (Mayer 1988; Mayer and Hubbard
1990; Petersen and Rajan 1995). Therefore, the theoretical effect of banking system
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concentration on debt maturity is ambiguous.3 Testing the bank-firm relationship
hypothesis Giannetti (2003) finds that, contrary to (her) expectations, maturity is shorter
in countries where the banking system is more concentrated.

Overall Level of Bank Credit
Diamond (1984) highlights the function of banks as “delegated monitors” that
emerge to reduce the cost of monitoring borrowers by exploiting economies of scale. In
the absence of banks, individual savers would incur the cost of assessing and monitoring
investment projects. With economies of scale, a larger banking system would have lower
monitoring costs, which reduces lending risk and increases the supply of long-term debt.
There is, however, an additional effect related to the volume of credit extended in an
economy. Diamond and Rajan (2000) argue that a larger pool of smaller, riskier, and less
collateralized borrowers would obtain access to external financing with the expansion of
the financial system. As most of the credits to these riskier borrowers are short-term, the
proportion of short-term debt in total debt would increase as overall lending increases.
Thus, the theoretical effect of credit levels of credit maturity is ambiguous.

Real Per Capita GDP
Ravid (1996) points to the “industry paradigm” of matching maturities introduced
by Morris (1976) where a firm with long-term assets should use long-term debt. If the
maturity of debt is longer than the asset life, the borrower might have a problem finding

3

Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) investigate whether the market structure of the banking sector has empirical
relevance for economic growth, finding that banking system concentration has a non-trivial impact on
growth, but that competition in banking does not necessarily dominate monopoly and vice versa.
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new assets to invest in but will have to continue servicing the debt. If debt maturity is
shorter than the asset life, then the borrower is exposed to the risk of being short on cash
when debt payments are due. Stohs and Mauer (1996) find evidence for this on the firm
level. Following Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999), we use per capita GDP to
proxy for the amount of fixed assets in a country, with richer countries having a larger
stock of long-term assets. Thus, higher GDP per capita is expected to be associated with
longer debt maturity.

Credit Information Sharing
Empirical researchers have shown that countries with institutions that gather and
share information about borrowers have higher private credit to GDP ratios (Brown,
Jappelli, and Pagano 2007; Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer 2007; Jappelli and Pagano
2002).4 Furthermore, because lack of information reduces the supply of long-term credit
(Diamond 2004), information sharing is also expected to lengthen debt maturity. Zhang
and Sorge (2007) provide a direct link between credit information sharing and credit
maturity in a model where information sharing is used by banks as a screening device and
leads to an equilibrium where short-term contracts are not preferred. Empirically, Zhang
and Sorge (2007) confirm their main hypothesis using data from publicly traded
companies to show that information sharing leads to longer credit maturity. We expect to
find the same effect.

4

Information sharing overcomes adverse selection (Pagano and Jappelli 1993) and moral hazard problems
(Padilla and Pagano 2000) in the credit markets. While, theoretically, the impact of information sharing on
aggregate lending is ambiguous, the increase in lending to safe borrowers is certain.
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Real Per Capita GDP Growth
Smith and Watts (1992) note that GDP growth rates can serve as a proxy for
investment opportunities: the demand for external financing would increase in boom
times and will recede in recession periods. It is not clear, however, whether expansions
would stimulate the demand for long-term and short-term credit in different ways.
Nonetheless, we follow the literature (Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic 1999; Qian and
Strahan 2007) and include the growth rate of per capita GDP in our estimations.

Output Volatility
Booth, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2001) look at the variability of the
return-on-assets to proxy for business risk expecting that an increase in variability would
shorten the maturity of credit as it proxies for the short-term operational component of
business risk. Giannetti (2003) notes that controlling for such risk has been neglected in
the previous cross-country research, at least partly because of lack of suitable empirical
proxies. The author uses a similar variable, but at the sectoral level, and shows that the
percent short-term debt increases with higher volatility of the return-on-assets of the
corresponding sector in that country. It is more difficult to account for such risks at the
country level. Nevertheless, if per capita GDP growth is a suitable proxy for investment
opportunities as noted in the previous literature, then its variability can be used as a
measure of business risk.5

5

In the context of international lending, Valev (2007) relies on the same proxy and shows that higher
volatility of per capita GDP growth in a country leads U.S. banks to shorten the maturity of credit to that
country.
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Manufacturing Share of Output
Barclay and Smith (1995) and Scherr and Hulburt (2001) show that the maturity
of credit differs substantially across economic sectors with manufacturing firms having a
larger fraction of long-term credit as percent of their overall credit. We include the
percent of manufacturing in total output as a proxy for the importance of the
manufacturing sector on the country level. We expect that credit in countries with a larger
manufacturing sector will have longer maturity.
The correlations in Panel B of Table 2 show that inflation and output volatility are
negatively and significantly correlated with the percent long-term credit. Also, rule of
law, credit information sharing, and GDP per capita are positively and significantly
correlated with the percent long-term credit. The correlation between economic growth
and the percent long-term credit is positive and significant as is the correlation between
the credit level and the percent long-term credit.

Methodology
By construction private credit and the percent long-term credit are determined
jointly and, therefore, we need to control for the endogeneity of private credit. Following
the literature, we use countries’ legal origin as external instruments for the level of credit.
However, for those to be valid instruments, we would have to assume that legal origin
does not have an impact on credit maturity, except through its effect on credit. This may
not be the case as Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) and Qian and Strahan (2007)
find that legal origin influences credit maturity. In addition, we would be constrained to
using a random effects model (since the legal origin does not change over time) even
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though the Hausman test reveals that the explanatory variables used in the random-effects
model are correlated with the country specific effects and, therefore, we have to use a
fixed-effects estimation. To resolve these problems, we implement the Hausman-Taylor
(1981) estimator that corrects for correlation between the explanatory variables and the
country-level random-effects, and does not require the use of outside instruments.6
When explaining the percent long-term credit one concern that arises is that the
dependent variable is a ratio (between 0 and 100 percent) making OLS problematic as the
predicted values might lay outside the unit interval (Papke and Wooldridge 1996). This
may require the transformation of the dependent variable using a log-odds transformation
(log(y/1−y)). However, the coefficient estimates using the log-odds ratio are difficult to
interpret in a panel setting and therefore we follow the previous literature (DemirgüçKunt and Maksimovic 1999; Rodrik and Velasco 1999; Valev 2006; 2007) and do not
perform the transformation. Furthermore, less than 1 percent of the predicted values from
the models fall outside the unit interval.

Results
Table 5 presents the empirical results regarding determinants of credit maturity.
We start with a benchmark equation where the percent long-term debt is explained by
rule of law, inflation, financial and economic development, and economic growth. Then
we add, one at a time, a dummy variable for credit information sharing, banking system

6

For robustness, Table C1in the appendix presents a set of empirical results where we use a random-effects
estimator, a fixed-effects estimator, GLS estimators that control for a heteroskedastic error structure and
allow for AR(1) autocorrelation, as well as a two-stage least squares random-effects estimator. The
estimated effects are similar across the various estimations.
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Table 5. Determinants of Credit Maturity
(1)
5.308
(0.035)
-3.939
(0.000)
0.266
(0.081)
11.006
(0.000)
0.311
(0.248)

Rule of Law
Inflation
Growth
Credit
Income
Credit Information
Sharing
Banking Industry
Concentration
Stock Market Turnover
Ratio
Output Volatility
Manufacturing Share of
Output
U.K. Legal Origin
French Legal Origin
German Legal Origin
Socialist Legal Origin
Constant
Hausman test:
Observations
Countries

(2)
5.041
(0.043)
-3.364
(0.000)
0.220
(0.148)
10.443
(0.000)
0.362
(0.175)
6.940
(0.001)

(3)
4.490
(0.145)
-2.455
(0.006)
0.138
(0.424)
11.291
(0.000)
0.698
(0.029)

(4)
6.925
(0.044)
-12.418
(0.021)
-0.045
(0.823)
14.962
(0.000)
0.270
(0.388)

(5)
4.197
(0.105)
-2.848
(0.002)
0.137
(0.369)
13.465
(0.000)
0.148
(0.580)

(6)
8.331
(0.003)
-3.861
(0.000)
0.261
(0.099)
11.516
(0.000)
0.109
(0.711)

1.504
(0.632)
-0.952
(0.168)
-0.678
(0.595)

5.141
(0.658)
9.606
(0.400)
11.818
(0.394)
23.087
(0.055)
48.685
(0.000)

7.888
(0.495)
10.718
(0.345)
12.313
(0.375)
26.770
(0.026)
40.788
(0.001)

χ2 (d.f.) 6.41 (5) 5.43 (6)
p-value
0.268
0.490
504
504
71
71

12.948
(0.366)
15.879
(0.256)
15.010
(0.379)
32.466
(0.029)
39.351
(0.007)

-2.505
(0.844)
1.866
(0.877)
6.453
(0.660)
26.432
(0.056)
52.309
(0.000)

-1.218
(0.915)
3.427
(0.762)
8.347
(0.581)
16.725
(0.161)
59.692
(0.000)

-1.010
(0.000)
0.506
(0.969)
4.217
(0.740)
14.710
(0.360)
24.301
(0.068)
67.446
(0.000)

(7)
6.857
(0.047)
-11.418
(0.070)
0.194
(0.334)
15.098
(0.000)
0.334
(0.300)
6.573
(0.001)
5.092
(0.140)
0.142
(0.832)
0.003
(0.999)
-0.611
(0.038)
-0.281
(0.983)
3.905
(0.746)
10.642
(0.491)
32.692
(0.017)
55.856
(0.000)

8.83 (6) 4.87 (6) 3.46 (6) 2.09 (6) 0.88 (10)
0.183
0.561
0.749
0.911
0.909
419
322
483
418
284
67
48
68
65
45

Notes: See Table 1 for variable definitions. Results are based on Hausman-Taylor estimation,
where Credit is endogenous. P-values are reported in parentheses below coefficients. Credit is
treated as endogenous. The Hausman test has a null hypothesis that the explanatory variables are
not correlated with the country-specific random-effects.
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concentration, stock market development measured by the stock market turnover ratio,
output volatility, and the share of the manufacturing sector in GDP. In column (7) we
report the estimations from a regression where we include all explanatory variables.
It is immediately clear that the rule of law has a statistically significant and robust
effect on the maturity of credit. Greater rule of law is associated with longer debt
maturity. Looking at the estimations from the benchmark equation, a decrease in the rule
of raw by one standard deviation leads to a decrease of the percent long-term credit by
5.57 percentage points (1.05*5.308). This result compares well with previous findings. In
Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999), a decrease of the Law & Order index by 1.05
index points decreases the percent long-term debt by 5.78 percentage points.7 To
illustrate, if the Slovak Republic (where the rule of law index is 0.288) had the rule of
law level of Austria (1.891), its long-term credit would increase by 8.51 percentage
points.
Inflation also affects credit maturity in significant ways with higher inflation
leading to shorter credit maturity in all specifications. We explore the size of the effect of
inflation in more detail later. Countries with deeper financial markets have a greater
fraction of long-term credits. The estimates from the benchmark equation in column (1)
suggest that if Slovakia (where private credit is 25.67 percent of GDP) had the level of
private credit of Hungary (72.22 percent), it would also have 11.38 percentage points
greater percent long-term credit. Thus, the process of financial deepening is accompanied
by lengthening of the maturity of credit as suggested by Diamond (1984).
7

Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) use a different index to measure rule of law but their index has a
nearly identical definition to ours (“the degree to which citizens of a country are able to utilize the existing
legal system to mediate disputes and enforce contracts”). In addition, their index has a similar standard
deviation (1.597) and a similar range (4.286).
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To test whether information sharing affects credit maturity, we follow Qian and
Strahan (2007) and include a dummy variable that equals 1 if a country had either a
public credit registry or a private credit bureau in a particular year, and 0 otherwise.
Credit information sharing is statistically significant when included in the base estimation
model and in the full model. The more conservative yet statistically significant estimate
in column (7) suggests that if Luxembourg had established a credit information sharing
institution, the percent long-term credit would increase from 59.72 percent to 66.30
percent, bringing it to the same percentage long-term credit as in Belgium. Using the
same estimate, if China had not established a credit information sharing institution in
2003, the average percent long-term credit would have remained at 29.48 percent, a level
below Congo or Burkina. Instead, the percent long-term credit in China increased to
36.24 percent.
China is not the only country that established a credit information sharing
institution during the years covered by our data–Norway implemented one in 1998,
Bulgaria in 1999, and Romania in 2000, to name a few. Figure 1 shows that, perhaps not
coincidentally, the percent long-term credit increased in all countries that implemented a
credit information sharing institution (except Serbia, where the implementation coincided
with financial liberalization, closure of major banks, and overall reduction in credit). This
was particularly true in countries that started at a relatively low percent of long-term
credit. For example, the percent long-term credit in Romania doubled after the
introduction of a public credit registry.
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Figure 1. Credit Information Sharing Institutions and Credit Maturity. Plotted are the
averages of the percent long-term credit for the period before and after the establishment
of credit information sharing institutions. The years included vary by country depending
on data availability. For The Czech Republic each period includes 5 years; for Latvia,
Poland, Romania, and Republic of Serbia 4 years; for Bulgaria and China 3 years; for
FRY Macedonia 2 years; and for Norway 1 year.

Economic development measured by per capita GDP, which was included to
proxy for the importance of long-term capital and to test the hypothesis of maturity
matching is not statistically significant. This result differs from Demirgüç-Kunt and
Maksimovic (1999) who find evidence for maturity matching on the firm level. The
difference in results may be attributed to the imprecise measure of fixed assets that we
employ compared to Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic who use a direct measure of fixed
assets as a share of total assets. Similar to us, Qian and Strahan (2007) use per capita
GDP to control for economic development and report an insignificant impact on maturity.

35
GDP growth has mostly a positive coefficient, which implies that faster growing
countries have more long-term credit. However, the coefficient is significant at the
accepted confidence levels only when we control for the manufacturing share of output in
column (6) and therefore we refrain from making stronger claims. Nevertheless, with the
results on inflation, we interpret this finding in line with Booth, Demirgüç-Kunt, and
Maksimovic (2001): agents can borrow to invest in more productive, longer gestation
projects against real, but not against inflationary growth prospects.
The rest of the results suggest that banking industry concentration, stock market
development, and output volatility do not affect bank credit maturity. Contrary to
expectations, a greater share of manufacturing is associated with less long-term credit.
Unfortunately data limitations prevent us from investigating whether this effect is driven
by particular non-manufacturing sectors, e.g., utilities, transportation, and/or
construction.

Inflation and Credit Maturity
To examine further the relationship between inflation and credit maturity, we
reestimated the regression reported in column (7) using 40 subsamples ordered by the
rate of inflation as in Rousseau and Wachtel (2002) and Boyd, Levine, and Smith (2001).
Both papers investigate the effect of inflation on financial sector activity and not on the
maturity of credit specifically. However, the authors explain that the effect of financial
development on economic growth diminishes with inflation because high inflation limits
long-term financial contracting. Here we provide direct evidence for that idea.
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Rousseau and Wachtel (2002) find that inflation reduces the availability of bank
credit at low inflation rates but after some threshold (which they estimate to be around 16
percent) the negative effect of additional inflation on credit activity disappears. Similarly,
Boyd, Levine, and Smith (2001) conclude that, while there is a statistically significant
and economically important negative relationship between inflation and banking sector
development, the marginal impact of inflation on bank lending activity diminishes
rapidly. The threshold inflation rate above which inflation has no effect on credit market
activity in Boyd, Levine, and Smith (2001) is very close to that in Rousseau and Wachtel
(2002): 15 percent. Boyd, Levine, and Smith (2001) conclude that until this threshold is
reached “the damage to the financial system has already been done, [and] further
increases in inflation will have no additional consequences for financial sector
performance or economic growth.” This is consistent with the anecdotal evidence from
Brazil provided by Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) who explain that an
inflationary environment gives rise to the indexation of financial contracts (and the
dollarization of financial assets) reducing the negative impact of additional high inflation
on credit markets.
To examine these ideas using our data set, we sorted all observations according to
the rate of inflation and estimated repeatedly the full model from column (7) in Table 4
starting with observations 1 through 244, then on 2 through 245, continuing until the last
subsample that includes observations 40 through 284. The estimated coefficients of
inflation, along with the 95 percent confidence intervals, are plotted in Figure 2. Looking
at Figure 2, we can identify three regions in terms of the effect of inflation on the percent
long-term credit. Inflation significantly reduces the percent long-term credit until
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inflation reaches about 14 percent. After that point, the effect of inflation on the percent
long-term credit declines markedly. When the inflation rate reaches about 25 percent, the
negative effect of inflation on credit maturity increases again.
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Figure 2: Impact of Inflation on Credit Maturity at Different Inflation Levels. Plotted are
the estimated coefficients of inflation and 95 percent confidence intervals when we use
subsamples ordered by inflation. Each subsample contains 244 observations. The values
on the abscissa correspond to the subsamples used in the estimations, while values on the
ordinate represent the coefficient (and confidence intervals) estimates of inflation for the
corresponding subsample.

The low range of inflation until about 14 percentage points is very close to the
ranges reported by Rousseau and Wachtel (2002) and Boyd, Levine, and Smith (2001).
However, our estimations suggest that the negative effect of high inflation reappears at
“high” inflation rates. It is possible that the indexations of financial contracts cannot
sufficiently reduce the uncertainty about the real value of nominal payments when
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inflation becomes too high (and too volatile). In addition, Demirgüç-Kunt and
Maksimovic (1999) note that very high inflation rates reveal a deterioration of institutions
other than central banking. For example, even efficient legal systems take time to enforce
contracts. As Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic argue, while payments can be indexed,
borrowers and lenders cannot “index judgment.”
To recount, the major determinants of the maturity composition of bank credit to
the private sector are rule of law, inflation, the existence of institutions for credit
information sharing, and the size of the financial system. These effects are robust across
various estimation techniques and specifications of the models. They are also robust to
substituting the rule of law measures with alternative indexes (e.g., the ICRG variables
and an index of corruption), to different definitions of the credit information sharing
variable (public vs. private agencies) and to the inclusion of additional control variables
such as the share of foreign banks and the share of government owned banks (which
reduce the sample size substantially and are not statistically significant). The next section
builds on these results to examine the effect of credit maturity (and its determinants) on
economic growth.

Credit Maturity and Economic Growth
The literature usually investigates the effect of finance on growth by averaging
data over 5 years to reduce the impact of business cycles and to concentrate on long-term
growth. Proceeding in the same fashion would reduce the number of observations in our
data set substantially as the sample period for most countries is about 10 years long.
Fortunately, the literature has dealt with this issue. Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2005)
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investigate the impact of equity market liberalization on economic growth by using
overlapping data. The five-year averages are constructed as 1990-95, then 1991-96, 199297, and so on, producing 6 five-year averages from any 10 years of annual data. While
this ingenious methodology increases the number of observations, it calls for the
adjustment of the moving average component in the residuals as introduced by Newey
and West (1987). Without the adjustment, the standard t-tests lead to a slight overrejection (Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad 2001). The procedure provides serialcorrelation and heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors.8 Following the literature,
e.g., Beck, Levine, and Loayza (2000) and Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000), we estimate
the growth equations using dynamic panel generalized-method-of-moments (GMM)
techniques to address the potential endogeneity of credit and other explanatory variables.
The technique is described in appendix A.

Results
Column (1) in Table 6 reports the results of an equation where economic growth
is explained by private sector credit, initial GDP per capita, government size, openness to
trade, and inflation. This is a standard specification from the finance and growth literature
(Beck, Levine, and Loayza 2000). Financial development is expected to lead to faster
economic growth. High inflation is an indicator of macroeconomic instability and is
expected to slow down economic growth. More open economies are expected to growth
faster. A large government size is taken as an indicator of inefficient use of resources and
8

Ranciere, Tornell, and Westermann (2003) also use overlapping averages to provide long-term predictions
of the finance and growth relationship and adjust their standard errors according to Newey and West
(1987). Petersen (2007) finds that about 7 percent of authors who use panel data in overall finance literature
adjust their standard errors using the Newey-West procedure.
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is expected to reduce economic growth. Initial income is included to test for income
convergence.9

Table 6. Bank Credit Maturity and Economic Growth
(GMM System Estimation, 5-year Averages)
Credit

(1)
2.296
(0.031)

(2)
2.015
(0.095)
6.020
(0.001)

-2.164
(0.031)
0.709
(0.800)
17.751
(0.000)
-2.607
(0.173)
44.624
(0.424)
0.204
0.639
499
64

-2.555
(0.012)
1.698
(0.545)
15.090
(0.000)
-0.645
(0.761)
-34.207
(0.016)
0.263
0.207
499
64

Percent Long-Term Credit
Stock Market Value Traded
Initial income per capita
Government size
Openness to trade
Inflation
Constant
Sargan test (p-value)
Serial correlation test (p-value)
Observations
Countries

(3)
0.342
(0.682)
6.824
(0.000)
6.979
(0.001)
-3.638
(0.000)
-3.508
(0.122)
8.541
(0.000)
-7.650
(0.000)
-3.282
(0.677)
0.645
0.098
387
44

(4)
2.469
(0.016)
6.267
(0.100)

-4.747
(0.000)
0.178
(0.940)
12.699
(0.000)
-8.647
(0.000)
-68.554
(0.000)
0.962
0.103
361
62

Notes: The dependent variable is the average yearly increase in real per capita GDP. Stock
Market Value Traded is defined as stock market value traded during a year divided by yearly
GDP, while other variables are defined in Table 1. Credit, Percent Long-Term Credit,
Government size, Openness to trade, and Initial income per capita enter the regression as
log(variable). Inflation enters the regression as log(1 + Inflation). P-values based on Newey-West
adjusted heteroscedastic-serial consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses below the
coefficients. The Sargan test has the null hypothesis that the instruments are not correlated with
the residuals. The serial correlation test has a null hypothesis that the errors in the first difference
regressions do not exhibit second order serial correlation.
9

We could not obtain recent data on education levels for many countries for the later years in our sample.
We carried out all estimations with a smaller sample including education and obtained qualitatively similar,
but less statistically significant results on all variables.
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The results show that private credit has a positive and statistically significant
effect on economic growth. Besides being statistically significant, private credit also has
a large economic effect, similar to the effect reported in the previous literature. To
illustrate, we compare our results with the estimates of Beck, Levine, and Loayza (2000):
a 10 percent exogenous increase in private credit leads to an additional 0.216 percentage
points of economic growth per year using our estimated coefficient,10 and to 0.228
percentage point of additional yearly growth using the estimated coefficient of Beck,
Levine, and Loayza (2000). The coefficients on all control variables except government
size have the expected signs. Openness to trade and initial income per capita are
statistically significant at the accepted confidence levels. The specification tests confirm
the validity of our results: we cannot reject the null hypothesis of the Sargan tests or of
the serial-correlation test at the accepted confidence levels in all specifications.
In column (2) we add the percent long-term credit. Credit maturity has a positive
and statistically significant effect on economic growth as predicted by Bencivenga and
Smith (1991). In terms of economic size a 10 percent increase in the portion of long-term
credit leads to an additional 0.574 percentage points of economic growth per year.11 As
the average growth rate in the sample is 2.98 percent, the impact of an increase in credit
maturity on growth is large (an increase of over 19 percent).
Consider the following example to illustrate the economic impact of credit
maturity. Private credit in Italy is 71.11 percent of GDP which is well above the sample
average of 53.04 percent. Thus, by the standard measure of financial development, Italy

10
11

The calculation is as performed follows: 2.296 * ln(1.1) = 0.216.

The calculation is as follows: 6.02 * ln(1.1) = 0.574; where 6.02 is the coefficient of the percent longterm credit in column (2).

42
has above average financial development. However, only 52.66 percent of private credit
in Italy is long-term which is below the sample average of 54.14 percent. Thus, Italian
banks extend relatively large volumes of credit but much of the credit is short-term
compared to other countries. If private credit in Italy declined to the sample average,
economic growth in Italy would decline by 0.310 percentage points. However, if the
percent long-term credit in Italy increased to the sample average, economic growth would
increase by 0.167 percentage points. Therefore, if most of the reduction in credit
originated from a decline in short-term credits, the negative impact of reduced credit to
the private sector would be countered to some extent by the longer maturity of credit.
For robustness, in column (3) we add the stock market value traded as a measure
of stock market development. The stock market is an alternative source of long-term
financing and its inclusion in the model might reduce the effect of credit maturity on
economic growth. Although the sample size decreases from 64 to 44 countries, the
coefficient on credit maturity remains statistically significant. Similar results were
obtained using alternative measures for stock market development such as the turnover
ratio and stock market capitalization.

The determinants of credit maturity
and economic growth
Section 3 shows that credit maturity is longer in countries that have strong
institutions, low inflation, and institutions for sharing credit information among financial
institutions. These characteristics also influence economic growth through their impact
on credit maturity. Furthermore, the impact is large. Using the estimations in column (2)
in Table 5, we obtained the predicted values for the percent long-term credit. Then, we
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reestimated the growth equation using the predicted values for the percent long-term
credit. These results are reported in column (4) of Table (6).
Putting together the estimates from sections 3 and 4, we estimate that an increase
in the rule of law index by 1 index point would increase economic growth (via credit
maturity) by 0.586 percentage points a year.12 A decrease of inflation by one standard
deviation leads to a 0.246 percentage points faster economic growth.13 The establishment
of a credit information sharing institution in a country would raise economic growth by
0.718 percentage points.14 These effects on economic growth via credit maturity are
separate from other channels through which strong institutions, low inflation and
institutions for credit information sharing might affect growth.

Conclusion
This chapter is an investigation into one of the important functions of the banking
system: to transform short-term liquid deposits into long-term illiquid financial assets that
can fund long gestation activities and, thus, raise the rate of economic growth. The results
show that the extent to which banks perform this function well has an important effect on

12

1.00 increase in rule of law leads to (5.308 * 1.00 =) 5.31 percentage points increase in percent long-term
credit. At the average of 54.14 percent long-term credit, this leads to an increase in yearly GDP growth of
(6.27 * (ln(0.541+ 0.053) – ln(0.541))=) 0.586 percentage points.
13

0.55 decrease in inflation leads to (3.939 * 0.55 =) 2.17 percentage points increase in percent long-term
credit. At the sample average of 54.14 percent long-term credit, this leads to an increase in yearly GDP
growth of (6.27 * (ln(0.5414 + 0.0217) – ln(0.5414))=) 0.246 percentage points. Please note that this
calculation ignores the independent impact of inflation on growth.

14

The establishment of a credit information sharing institution would increase the percent long-term credit
by 6.573 percentage points. At the average of 54.14 percent long-term credit, this leads to an increase in
yearly GDP growth of (6.27*(ln(0.7604+0.06573) – ln(0.7604)=) 0.718 percentage points.
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the relationship between the financial system and economic growth. Economic growth is
faster in countries where the banking system extends more long-term credits.
Furthermore, the results show that credit maturity depends on a number of
institutional and economic factors. Greater rule of law, low inflation, and schemes for
sharing of credit information between financial institutions contribute to lengthening the
maturity of bank credit. From a policy perspective, the institutions for sharing credit
information probably present the most interest because their establishment is a policy
choice. We show that such institutions can increase the effectiveness of credit in terms of
economic growth by making it easier for financial intermediaries to extend long-term
credits.

CHAPTER FOUR
THE DETERMINANTS OF CREDIT MATURITY
IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES

The second chapter described how the maturity transformation function of the
banking sector leads to an increase in output growth from a theoretical perspective. The
previous chapter presented empirical evidence on the maturity of credit and growth
relationship and has confirmed the theoretical prediction that longer credit maturity
increases the rate of economic growth. In addition, the chapter draws on the previous
literature to formulate hypotheses about the determinants of credit maturity and confirms
several of them in a broad sample of countries. The main limitation of the previous
chapter is the definition of long-term credit as credit with contractual maturity longer
than one year. This chapter overcomes this limitation by looking at the determinants of
credit maturity by isolating the portion of credit with contractual maturity of one year or
less, the portion of credit with contractual maturity longer than one year, and the portion
of credit with contractual maturity longer than five years. Thus, we can investigate shortterm, long-term, and very long-term credit. Credit data that allow such categorization are
available for 14 transition countries. This is a smaller but more homogeneous sample of
countries. We also have more frequent quarterly observations compared to the yearly data
used in the previous chapter.
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We find that most results on the determinants of the portion of credit with
maturity longer than one year obtained in the previous chapter still hold. For example, the
rule of law remains a significant determinant of credit maturity and the magnitude of the
estimated coefficients is similar. Similarly, financial deepening is accompanied by
lengthening of the maturity of credit in both samples. Inflation is a much more significant
determinant in a broader set of countries, while per capita GDP growth and stock market
activity are more significant in the set of countries examined here. In addition, we find
that the portion of credit with maturity longer than five years is driven by similar
determinants as the portion of credit with maturity longer than one year, but the
significance and magnitude of each determinant differs. For example, weak rule of law
reduces the portion of credit with maturity longer than five years more than it does the
portion of credit with maturity longer than one year. Interestingly, inflation has a larger
effect on the portion of credit with maturity longer than one year.
In addition to the determinants discussed in the previous chapter, we also
investigate whether state and foreign ownership of banks influences credit maturity, and
find that, credit maturity is longer in countries with more privately owned domestic
banks. We also look in more detail at credit information sharing institutions and find that
the quality of information and the ownership structure of such institutions (public vs.
private) have an important impact on maturity.
We describe the data in the following section. The literature on financial
development during transition suggests several additional testable hypotheses on the
determinants of credit maturity in this particular sample and we review them, along with
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the determinants studied in the previous chapter, in section 2. Section 3 presents the
results and section 4 concludes.

Data
We use quarterly data on lending by banks to the private sector in 14 countries
spanning the period from about 1995 to 2006, depending on data availability for the
individual countries. Table 7 provides variable definitions and details the sources of the
data for all variables. The sample includes all countries for which we could identify a
consistent data source. Credit is decomposed into three categories: short-term credit that
has contractual maturity of one year or less, medium-term credit that has contractual
maturity between one year and five years, and long-term credit that has contractual
maturity longer than five years.
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Table 7. Variable Definitions and Sources
Variable
Credit / GDP

Definition
Credit by deposit money banks and other
financial institutions to the private sector
divided by quarterly GDP.

Portion of Credit with Credit with the original contractual
Maturity Longer than maturity longer than one year divided by
One Year
total credit.
Portion of Credit with Credit with the original contractual
Maturity Longer than maturity longer than five years divided
Five Years
by total credit.

Sources

Central bank of the
corresponding country.
Consulted were the official
publications and websites.

Short-Term Credit

Credit with the original contractual
maturity of one year or less divided by
quarterly GDP.

Medium- and LongTerm Credit

Credit with an original contractual
maturity longer than one year divided by
quarterly GDP.

Real Per Capita GDP
Growth

The percent increase in real per capita
GDP during the previous year.

Per Capita GDP

The real per capita GDP in US dollars at
the beginning of a year.

Inflation

The increase in the CPI from previous
quarter.

Rule of Law

Index that measures “the extent to which
agents have confidence in and abide by Kaufmann, Kraay, and
the rules of society, and in particular the Mastruzzi (2007).
quality of contract enforcement.”

Banking Industry
Concentration

The assets of three largest banks as a
share of assets of all commercial banks.

Credit Information
Sharing

Dummy taking 1 if public credit registry Author constructed from
or private credit bureau operates in a
Brown, Japelli, and Pagano
country during a year, 0 otherwise.
(2007).

State Banks’ Asset
Share

Share of majority state-owned banks’
assets in total bank sector assets.

The official statistical
institute or the central bank
of the corresponding
country. Data were cross
checked with IMF’s IFS,
Eurostat, and OECD’s
quarterly national accounts.

Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and
Levine (2000).

EBRD “Structural change
Share of total bank sector assets in banks indicators.”
with foreign ownership exceeding 50
percent.
Stock Market Turnover Stock Market volume traded during a
Official stock exchange of
quarter divided by quarterly GDP.
corresponding country.
Output Volatility
Root mean squared errors from yt = α +
Author constructed from data
εt, using data from the preceding 10
on Real GDP growth.
quarters, where y is Real GDP growth.
Foreign Banks’ Asset
Share
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Table 8 lists the time period for the 14 countries in the sample. There are, on
average, 35 observations per country. Latvia has the longest time series of 58 quarters,
from the fourth quarter of 1992 to the first quarter of 2007. The earliest observation is in
Slovenia (first quarter of 1992), while the most recent observations are in the Slovak
Republic and Ukraine (second quarter of 2007). The shortest time series of only 11
quarters is from Albania. Although detailed credit data are available for most countries,
the unavailability of some controls limited the sample. For example, although quarterly
credit data for Bosnia and Herzegovina are available from 1997 to 2007, we were unable
to obtain GDP data for the same period.

Table 8. Bank Credit and Bank Credit Maturity by Country
Country Average Values
Country
Albania
Bulgaria
Czech Republic
Estonia
Hungary
Latvia
Lithuania
Macedonia, FYR
Poland
Romania
Serbia, Republic of
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
Ukraine
Sample

Credit as a
Share of Percent of Credit with Maturity
GDP
over 1 year
over 5 years
9.32
52.03
17.42
124.48
62.95
20.96
195.96
64.46
39.64
151.02
80.93
42.79
85.73
52.60
34.40
105.13
62.80
22.30
71.53
60.66
53.55
65.81
52.87
101.12
63.28
34.80
57.61
44.41
15.41
100.80
56.09
210.14
41.49
25.52
120.37
59.83
89.23
39.73
112.32
59.02
31.59

Notes: For variable definitions, please see Table 7.

Coverage
From

To

Q3/2003
Q4/1999
Q1/1993
Q1/1994
Q4/1995
Q4/1992
Q1/1995
Q4/2000
Q4/1996
Q4/1997
Q1/1999
Q4/2002
Q1/1992
Q4/1996

Q1/2006
Q1/2007
Q1/2007
Q1/2007
Q1/2007
Q1/2007
Q4/2004
Q4/2006
Q1/2007
Q1/2007
Q1/2007
Q2/2007
Q1/2006
Q2/2007
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Table 8 shows large differences in terms of financial development measured as
private credit as a share of quarterly GDP. In Albania, private credit is below 10 percent
whereas in the Slovak Republic it is over 200 percent of quarterly GDP. 15 Credit as a
share of quarterly GDP increased over time in most countries. Figure 3 presents this trend
for several countries over the past 11 years.

1996

1997
Estonia

1998

1999

Hungary

2000
Latvia

2001

2002
Poland

2003

2004

Slovenia

2005

2006

Ukraine

Figure 3. Credit as a Share of GDP. Presented are yearly average values of credit divided
by quarterly GDP for selected countries and time periods.

The banking system during the early transition period was characterized by state
ownership of banks, which were forced to extend loans to inefficient state owned
enterprises under contract terms determined by politics and not by the soundness of
projects (Drakos 2003; Eller and Haiss 2003; Fink et al. 1998). To increase the efficiency
15

Please note that we divide the stock of credit by quarterly, not by yearly GDP. Therefore, the numbers
are about four times greater than when we divide the stock of credit by yearly GDP as in the previous
chapter.
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of capital allocations, almost all countries privatized banks and increased the share of
foreign owned banks (Berglof and Bolton 2002; Eller, Haiss, and Steiner 2005; Naaborg
et al. 2003). Figure 4 makes apparent the trend of growing asset share of private and
foreign owned banks over time.
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Figure 4. State and Foreign Ownership of Banks. Presented are assets owned by each
type of banks as a share of all bank assets. These are averages across countries.

Table 9 shows descriptive statistics and the correlations of the variables used in
the estimations. On average, 59.02 percent of bank credit to the private sector has
maturity longer than one year, while 31.59 percent has maturity longer than five years.16
There are, however, large differences between countries as shown in Table 8. Less than
16

This compares well with the data used in previous chapter, as the average portion of credit with maturity
longer than one year was 54.14 percent.
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30 percent of credit in Ukraine has maturity longer than one year, while in Estonia such
credit is over 80 percent. Credit with maturity longer than five years is only 15.41 percent
of all credit in Romania, while it is 53.55 percent in Lithuania. Figure 5 makes these
differences clear by presenting credit levels and the percent of credit with maturity longer
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Figure 5. Bank Credit and Bank Credit Maturity by Country. Values on the left ordinate
correspond to bars showing credit relative to GDP, while values on the right ordinate
correspond to a line showing percent of medium- and long-term credit
.

Notes: * denotes significance at the 5 percent. For variable definitions, please see Table 7.

Foreign
Real
State
Credit w/ Credit w/
Stock
Credit Banks’ Banks’ Banking
Maturity Maturity Per cap. Per
Credit / over 1
Asset Industry Output Market
GDP Capita Rule
Info.
Asset
over 5
Share
GDP year(%) years(%) Growth GDP of Law Inflation Sharing Share
Conc. Volatility Turnover
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics
Mean
112.32
59.02
31.59
3.92 3,903
0.18
13.75
0.69
22.16
50.45
0.71
2.66
0.10
Minimum
6.14
4.12
1.04 -31.34
590 -1.14
-1.65
0
0
0
0.36
0.44
0
Maximum
371.55
92.95
69.50 37.13 11,382
1 331.09
1
90.90
99.40
1
13.09
0.89
Std. Dev.
66.46
17.22
17.10
5.71 2,323
0.58
29.82
0.46
22.96
31.16
0.18
2.19
0.14
Panel B: Correlations
Credit / GDP
1.00*
Maturity over 1
0.47*
1.00*
year (%)
Maturity over 5
0.66*
0.81*
1.00*
years (%)
Growth
0.17*
0.42*
0.40* 1.00*
Per Capita GDP
0.43*
0.33*
0.75* 0.00* 1.00*
Rule of Law
0.48*
0.46*
0.72* 0.07* 0.82* 1.00*
Inflation
-0.20* -0.29*
-0.40* -0.45* -0.07* -0.35*
1.00*
Credit Info.
0.08*
0.23*
0.38* 0.18* 0.27* 0.36* -0.26*
1.00*
Sharing
State Banks
0.06*
-0.29*
-0.24* -0.31* 0.04* -0.23*
0.51* -0.30*
1.00*
Foreign Banks
0.09*
0.40*
0.41* 0.24* -0.09* 0.28* -0.43*
0.26* -0.62*
1.00*
Bank. Ind. Conc. 0.13*
0.11*
0.18* -0.16* 0.04* 0.15*
0.16*
0.19*
0.10*
0.09*
1.00*
Output Volatility -0.33* -0.24*
-0.36* 0.20* -0.45* -0.53*
0.55* -0.11*
0.46*
-0.19*
0.12*
1.00*
Stock Market
0.02*
0.02*
0.26* 0.04* 0.04* 0.24* -0.07*
0.16*
-0.2*
0.17*
0.16*
-0.13*
1.00*

Table 9. Summary Statistics
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Determinants of bank credit maturity
Following the discussion in the previous chapter, we employ the rule of law,
inflation, per capita GDP growth, the level of credit, per capita GDP, credit information
sharing, banking industry concentration, stock market development, and output volatility
as potential determinants of credit maturity. The rule of law is included as a measure of
the quality of contract enforcement and overall institutional quality, while inflation is a
measure of disincentives for long-term contracting. Per capita GDP and its growth are
included, respectively, as a proxy for fixed assets and as a measure of investment
opportunities. The level of private credit is included as a measure of economies of scale
in collecting information and as a measure of the potential exhaustion of long-term
lending opportunities. Credit information sharing is included as a proxy for better
information, while banking industry concentration is included to control for fewer
informational asymmetries (resulting from closer firm-bank relationship) or credit market
inefficiencies (resulting from the monopolization of the banking sector). Stock market
development is included as a measure of an additional information revelation mechanism
and as an alternative source of long-term financing. Finally, output volatility is included
as a measure that proxies for business risk.
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Recall that the empirical hypotheses regarding the effect of these variables on the
percent long-term credit are as follows:
−
+
+
⎛
⎞
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⎜
⎟
⎜
⎟
+
+
/
−
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⎜
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⎜
⎟
⎜ +/ −
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⎟
⎝
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While most variables have the same definition as in the previous chapter, we note
that we use different measures of per capita GDP growth and stock market development.
Per capita GDP growth in the previous chapter was measured contemporaneously with
the maturity variables, while now we use per capita GDP growth during the previous year
as data are unavailable at the quarterly level. In the previous chapter, we measured stock
market development using the stock market turnover ratio (defined as the volume traded
divided by capitalization), while in this chapter stock market development is measured
using stock market turnover (defined as volume traded divided by GDP).

Additional determinants of credit maturity
We incorporate several additional explanatory variables, some of which have a
particular relevance for the transition economies. Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic
(1999) note that, besides ensuring the stability of the national currency and strong
institutions, the government can also promote long-term financial contracting by
“granting implicit loan guarantees when it adopts a policy of subsidizing loss-generating
firms” (Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic 1999). The authors find that government
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subsidies to the corporate sector lengthen credit maturity, as these affect the financial
structure by permitting “some [, mostly small,] firms to obtain long-term loans on
favorable terms” (Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic 1999). La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
and Shleifer (2002) note that the government ownership of banks has the advantage over
subsidization policies as the government has more power in choosing projects, while
letting the more efficient private sector implement them. According to this “development
view,” the ownership of banks enables the government to direct funds “toward strategic
long-term projects” (La Porta, López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2002). However, the
authors note that the government, through the ownership of banks, can also direct lending
to achieve political goals. Therefore, only if the development view holds, we expect
longer-term credit in countries where the state controls a large fraction of the banking
system. To capture the extent to which the government controls the banking system we
use the banking system assets owned by state banks as a share of all banking sector
assets.
We also include the asset share of foreign owned banks. Berglof and Bolton
(2002) and Eller, Haiss, and Steiner (2005) argue that foreign owned banks introduce
efficiency into the financial sector of the transition countries. In a relatively weak
banking system, foreign banks enhance transparency and corporate governance, as they
show a stronger commitment in these areas compared to domestic private banks and state
owned banks (Naaborg et al. 2003). Foreign-owned banks also possess greater risk
management expertise and can diversify risk across several countries where they operate
(de Haas and van Lelyveld 2006). All of those may contribute to the availability of long-
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term credit. However, foreign owned banks may also limit the long-term financing to
unprofitable project that were previously funded in a less transparent environment.
The literature (e.g. Fink, Haiss, and Mantler 2005; Fink, Haiss, and Vukšić 2004)
also points out that the stage of transition is important with more advanced economies
having more developed financial sectors. We include a dummy variable for EU
membership as an indicator of transition progress.

Methodology
By construction private credit and the percent of credit with maturity longer than
one year (or longer than five years) are determined jointly and, therefore, we need to
control for the endogeneity of private credit. One empirical strategy applied in the
previous chapter was using countries’ legal origin as external instruments for the level of
credit in random-effects instrumental variable estimation. However, as all countries
considered in this chapter have socialist legal origin, this approach cannot be applied.
Therefore, we proceed by first applying fixed-effects estimator to eliminate country
specific effect. Then we estimate the model using a generalized least squares (GLS)
random-effects estimator that controls for a heteroscedastic error structure. However, the
Hausman test reveals that the explanatory variables used in the GLS model are correlated
with the country specific effects and, therefore, we implement the Hausman-Taylor
(1981) estimator. This estimator corrects for the correlation between the explanatory
variables and the country-level random-effects, and is suitable as it does not require the
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use of external instruments. In addition, the coefficient estimates from the HausmanTaylor estimations are similar to ones obtained using fixed-effects.17

Results
Table 10 presents the empirical results regarding the determinants of the portion
of credit with maturity longer than one year and the portion of credit with maturity longer
than five years using the Hausman-Taylor estimation.18 For each dependent variable we
use a simple set of determinants and a full set of determinants.
It is immediately clear that the rule of law has a statistically significant and robust
effect on either maturity measure, with greater rule of law being associated with longerterm credit. Looking at the results in column (2), a decrease in the rule of raw by one
standard deviation (0.58) that would bring the rule of law in Poland to the one in Bulgaria
leads to a decrease of the portion of credit with maturity longer than one year by 5.16
percentage points (0.58*8.905). Looking at column (4), the same decrease in the rule of
law decreases the portion of credit with maturity longer than five years by 6.23
percentage points (0.58*10.744). The results reveal that weak rule of law reduces the

17

As in the previous chapter, one additional concern is that each dependent variable is a ratio (between 0
and 100 percent). When we explain the portion of credit with maturity longer than one year, the predicted
values rarely fall out of the unit interval using any estimator. However, when we explain the portion of
credit with maturity longer than five years using the fixed-effects estimator, as much as 17 percent of the
predicted values are outside the unit interval. We follow the previous literature (Demirgüç-Kunt and
Maksimovic 1999; Rodrik and Velasco 1999; Valev 2006; 2007) and proceed without transforming the
dependent variable.
18

Tables C2 and C3 in the appendix present the results from fixed-effects and GLS estimations. In
addition, Tables C4 and C5 present same results when the dependent variables are, respectively, the portion
of short-term credit (maturity of one year or less) and the portion of medium-term credit (with maturity
from one year up to [and including] five years).
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portion of credit with maturity longer than five years more than it does the portion of
credit with maturity longer than one year.

Table 10. Determinants of Credit Maturity

Rule of Law
Inflation
Previous Year GDP Growth
Credit
Per Capita GDP
Credit Information Sharing
Banking Industry Concentration
Stock Market Turnover
Output Volatility
State Banks’ Asset Share
Foreign Banks’ Asset Share
EU Member
Constant

Hausman Test:
Observations
Countries

χ2 (d.f.)
p-value

Percentage of Credit with
Maturity Longer than 1 year
(1)
(2)
9.577
8.905
(0.012)
(0.009)
-1.660
-21.541
(0.642)
(0.000)
0.401
1.236
(0.000)
(0.000)
3.430
3.764
(0.008)
(0.005)
6.028
2.122
(0.000)
(0.036)
2.642
(0.024)
-3.587
(0.309)
-6.257
(0.042)
0.170
(0.537)
-0.264
(0.000)
-0.034
(0.129)
-18.219
-11.792
(0.138)
(0.404)
44.253
57.806
(0.000)
(0.000)
0.22 (5)
0.989
461
14

1.05 (11)
0.999
317
11

Percentage of Credit with
Maturity Longer than 5 years
(3)
(4)
11.840
10.744
(0.001)
(0.004)
-6.867
-14.898
(0.030)
(0.048)
-0.084
-0.052
(0.531)
(0.692)
2.419
3.208
(0.020)
(0.021)
13.682
15.609
(0.000)
(0.000)
-2.597
(0.019)
2.386
(0.439)
-8.758
(0.009)
-0.059
(0.861)
-0.113
(0.007)
-0.025
(0.242)
-35.417
-30.835
(0.060)
(0.000)
8.485
(0.636)
1.33 (5)
0.931
278
10

0.37 (11)
1.000
211
9

Notes: See Table 7 for variable definitions. Results are based on Hausman-Taylor estimation,
where Credit is endogenous. P-values are reported in parentheses below coefficients. Hausman
test has a null hypothesis that explanatory variables are not correlated with the country-specific
random-effects.
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Higher inflation leads to relatively less credit with maturity longer than one year,
but the results are less robust as the estimated coefficient on inflation is insignificant in
the simple set of determinants. Higher inflation also leads to less credit with maturity
longer than five years. Looking at the statistically significant coefficient in column (2), an
increase in inflation by one standard deviation (0.298) decreases the portion of credit with
maturity longer than one year by 6.42 percentage points (-21.541*0.298). Looking at the
comparable coefficient in column (4), the same increase in inflation decreases the portion
of credit with maturity longer than five years by 4.44 percentage points (-14.898*0.298).
When statistically significant, inflation has a greater effect on the portion of credit with
maturity longer than one year.
Per capita GDP growth significantly increases the portion of credit with maturity
longer than one year, while it is not a significant determinant of the portion of credit with
maturity longer than five years. This is an intuitive result: while an increase in GDP
growth (an indicator of investment opportunity) increases medium-term lending, longterm lending is not influenced by overall expectations, and the financing of projects with
longer gestation is unaffected by the current economic performance.
The level of credit as percent of GDP has a positive and statistically significant
effect on both maturity measures. Countries with deeper financial markets have a greater
fraction of credit with maturity longer than one year and longer than five years. To
illustrate, if FYR Macedonia (where private credit is 65.81 percent of quarterly GDP) had
the level of private credit of Bulgaria (124.48 percent), it would have 2.21 percentage
points greater fraction of credit with maturity longer than one year, based on column (2),
and it would also have 1.88 percentage points greater fraction of credit with maturity
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longer than five years, based on column (4). Thus, the process of financial deepening is
accompanied by lengthening of the maturity of credit. This result is in line with Diamond
(1984) who suggests that larger banking sectors have economies of scale in obtaining
information and monitoring borrowers. This result contradicts Diamond and Rajan (2000)
who argue that maturity shortens with the expansion of the banking sector, as a larger
pool of smaller, riskier, and less collateralized borrowers would obtain access to external
financing.
The coefficient estimate of per capita GDP, used as a proxy for the amount of
fixed assets in a country, is a significant determinant of both maturity measures.
However, the coefficients have much larger magnitude when we explain the portion of
credit with maturity longer than five years (13.7 to 15.6) when compared to the
corresponding coefficients for the portion of credit with maturity longer than one year
(2.1 to 6.0).19 The results are intuitive, as the amount of fixed assets is particularly
important for the long-term financing. An increase in per capita GDP of $1,000 (an
increase that would bring income in Ukraine to the level of Bulgaria) would result in an
increase in the portion of credit with maturity longer than five years by between 13.68
and 15.61 percentage points. As in Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999), the results
suggest that maturity matching is an important determinant of credit maturity in this set
of countries.
To test whether information sharing affects credit maturity, we follow Qian and
Strahan (2007) and include a dummy variable that equals 1 if a country had either a
public credit registry or a private credit bureau at the beginning of the year. Our results
19

In addition, when explaining portion of credit with maturity y longer than one year, the coefficient
estimate of per capita GDP is negative in GLS estimation as shown in Table C2.
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suggest that credit information sharing institutions increase the portion of credit with
maturity longer than one year, while the effect on the portion of credit with maturity
longer than five years is the opposite. The results suggest that the effect on each portion
is about 2½ percentage points. We provide further discussion later on in this section.
Stock market turnover is negatively associated with both measures of maturity.
Moreover, this negative effect is greater in magnitude (by about 40 percent) for the
portion of credit with maturity longer than five years. Therefore, the results suggest that
stock market activity in the transition countries can be considered as an alternative source
for long-term financing. The asset share of state owned banks has a negative and
significant effect on both measures of maturity, but the effect has greater magnitude on
the portion of credit with maturity longer than one year. The asset share of foreign owned
banks also has a negative effect, but much lower significance. Nevertheless, the two
results suggest that privately owned domestic banks tend to lengthen the credit maturity.
Therefore, in this set of countries we find the evidence that opposes the “development
view,” where the government owned banks direct funds toward strategic long-term
projects. The negative coefficient estimate of the EU membership dummy suggest that
countries at the earlier stage of transition have a greater portion of credit with maturity
longer than five years, while the effect on the portion of credit with maturity longer than
one year is insignificant. Output volatility and the banking industry concentration are not
significant determinants of credit maturity.20

20

We briefly compare the results on the determinants of the portion of credit with maturity longer than one
year obtained here to the results obtained in the previous chapter using broader set of countries. Rule of law
and the level of credit remain significant determinants of maturity. Inflation is a more significant
determinant in a broader set of countries, while per capita GDP and its growth are more significant here.
Credit information sharing has positive impact, but the estimated coefficient in a broad set of countries has
a greater magnitude (about 130 percent greater).
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In summary, the portions of credit with maturity longer than one year and longer
than five years are driven by similar determinants. Strong rule of law, the higher level of
financial development, and low government ownership of banks significantly increase
both portions of credit. Inflation has a greater negative effect on the portion of credit with
maturity longer than one year, while the stock market turnover has a greater negative
effect on the portion of credit with maturity longer than five years. Per capita GDP
growth significantly increases the portion of credit with maturity longer than one year,
while per capita GDP significantly increases the portion of credit with maturity longer
than five years. Credit information sharing increases the medium-term credit, as it
lengthens the overall maturity but decreases the portion of very long-term credit.

Credit Information Sharing and Credit Maturity
For each country in this chapter Brown, Jappelli, and Pagano (2007) collected
information about the year when a public credit registry or a private credit bureau was
established. In addition, the authors identify whether these institutions collect information
on consumers and/or firms, positive and/or negative information, how long the
information is kept, and what is the minimum amount of loans for which data are
collected. We use this information to construct a quality index for both types of
institutions, similar to the one in Brown, Jappelli, and Pagano (2007). If the institution is
present, the index takes on a value of 1, and 0 otherwise. If the institution existed for at
least six consecutive quarters, an additional point is added to the index. If information is
kept on both firms and consumers, an additional point is added to the index. Similarly, an
additional point is added if both positive and negative information is reported. An
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additional point is added if information is kept for at least two years. The final point is
added if the minimum amount of a loan for which the institution collects data is below
yearly per capita GDP (or if the threshold does not exist). Therefore, the quality index for
each type of institution ranges from 0 (if the institution does not exist) to 6 (if it meets all
criteria listed above). The quality index for the public credit registry and the private credit
bureau are added together to form an overall quality index.
Table 11 presents the results when we estimate the impact of different measures
of credit information sharing on both maturity measures. The results are based on a full
set of determinants, but for brevity we do not report the coefficients of the other
determinants. Columns (1) and (5) correspond to the estimated coefficients from columns
(2) and (4) from Table 10. The presence of credit information sharing institutions

Table 11. Credit Maturity and Credit Information Sharing

Credit Information Sharing

Presence
Public Credit
Registry
Private Credit
Bureau
Quality Index
(Overall)
Quality Index
(Public)
Quality Index
(Private)

Percentage of Credit with
Maturity Longer than 1 year
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
2.642
(0.024)
0.603
(0.664)
3.869
(0.002)
0.628
(0.003)
1.178
(0.001)
-0.033
(0.932)

Percentage of Credit with
Maturity Longer than 5 years
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
-2.597
(0.019)
1.586
(0.235)
-7.067
(0.000)
-0.828
(0.000)
-1.818
(0.000)
0.601
(0.115)

Notes: Estimation based on Hausman-Taylor model with a full set of determinants. P-values are
reported in parentheses below coefficients.
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increases the portion of credit with maturity longer than one year, while it decreases the
portion of credit with maturity longer than five years. When we look separately at the
presence of a public credit registry and a private credit bureau in columns (2) and (6), we
see that both results are driven by the presence of private credit bureaus. The presence of
a public credit registry does not have any significant influence on either maturity
measure.
Similar results are obtained in columns (3) and (7) when we use the index of
overall quality, as defined above, instead of an indicator for the existence of an
institution. The greater quality of the information sharing mechanisms increases the
portion of credit with maturity longer than one year, while it decreases the portion of
credit with maturity longer than five years. When the overall quality index is decomposed
into a quality index of public credit registries and a quality index of private credit
bureaus, we see new interesting result in columns (4) and (8). Namely, the increase in the
portion of credit with maturity longer than one year and the reduction in the portion of
credit with maturity longer than five years are both driven by the quality of public credit
registries. The quality of private credit bureaus does not have a significant influence on
either measure of maturity.
In summary, the portion of credit with maturity longer than one year and the
portion of credit with maturity longer than five years are both influenced by the credit
information sharing mechanisms. Credit information sharing increases the portion of
credit with maturity longer than one year, while it decreases the portion of credit with
maturity longer than five years. One explanation for this finding is the theoretical
prediction of Diamond (1991) where, in a setting with private information, good firms
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borrow short- and long-term to extract the benefits of good news while lowering liquidity
risk. With credit information sharing mechanisms information is no longer private.
Therefore, firms reduce short-term debt to lower the liquidity risk (as firms do not have to
reveal information) and they decrease long-term to lower the contractual cost.
Furthermore, our results suggest that effects arise through the establishment of private
credit bureaus or increased quality of public credit registries.

Institutions and Credit Maturity
To assess the robustness of the impact of rule of law as a measure of institutions,
we substitute it with alternative indexes of institutional quality. We use indexes of
government effectiveness (measuring the quality of public services, the quality of the
civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures), political
stability (measuring perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized
or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means), control of corruption (measuring the
extent to which public power is exercised for private gain), regulatory power (measuring
the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations
that permit and promote private sector development), and EBRD reform index
(measuring banking reform and interest rate liberalization). The first four indexes come
from Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2007) and they range from -2.5 to 2.5. The last
index comes from the EBRD transition indicators, and this index ranges from 1 to 5.
Table 12 presents the results when we substitute the rule of law with different
institutional measures. The results are based on a full set of determinants, but for brevity
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Table 12. Credit Maturity and Alternative Institutional Measures

Dependent Variable
Percentage of Credit
with Maturity Longer
than 1 year
Percentage of Credit
with Maturity Longer
than 5 years

Rule of
Law

Government Political
Effectiveness Stability

EBRD
Control of Regulatory Reform
Corruption
Power
Index

8.905
(0.009)

17.026
(0.000)

2.909
(0.160)

16.171
(0.000)

10.101
(0.000)

11.061
(0.000)

10.744
(0.004)

14.024
(0.000)

9.556
(0.000)

14.648
(0.000)

3.671
(0.217)

7.767
(0.000)

Notes: Estimation based on Hausman-Taylor model with a full set of determinants. P-values are
reported in parentheses below coefficients.

we do not report the coefficients of the other determinants. The results suggest that,
similar to the rule of law, the alternative institutional measures increase both measures of
maturity. However, the statistical significance and the magnitude of the impact on the
two maturity measures differ. The impact of political stability on the portion of credit
with maturity longer than five years is greater than the effect on the portion of credit with
maturity longer than one year.
Other indexes have a greater impact on the portion of credit with maturity longer
than one year. The impact of control of corruption on the portion of credit with maturity
longer than one year is 10 percent greater than the impact on the portion of credit with
maturity longer than five years, the impact of government effectiveness is 21 percent
greater, while the impact of EBRD reform index is 42 percent greater. The impact of
regulatory power on the portion of credit with maturity longer than five years is not
statistically significant. Despite some differences, the results suggest that institutions are
important determinant of credit maturity. Our results suggest that strong institutions
lengthen the maturity of credit. This impact is similar for the portion of credit with
maturity longer than one year and for the portion of credit with maturity longer than five
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years. Therefore, ours results suggest that strong institutions lengthen the maturity of
credit primarily through the positive impact on the long-term credit with maturity longer
than five years.21

Conclusion
The previous chapter shows that the extent to which banks perform their maturity
transformation function has an important effect on the relationship between the financial
system and economic growth. The availability of long-term credit is particularly
important, as economic growth is faster in countries where the banking system extends
more long-term credits. However, the data limitations allowed only the investigation of
the determinants of credit with maturity longer than one year.
In this chapter, we overcome this problem by looking at the portion of credit with
maturity longer than five years. We show that the maturity of bank credit to the private
sector is longer in countries with strong rule of law, low inflation, larger financial system,
higher level of economic development, less liquid stock markets, and smaller relative size
of state owned banks. These effects are robust across two definitions of maturity and
across various estimation techniques and model specifications. The effect of alternative
institutional measures is similar to one of rule of law. Credit information sharing tends to
increase the portion of credit with maturity longer than one year, while it tends to reduce
the portion of credit with maturity longer than five years. This effect is strong if private
credit bureaus exist or if public credit registries have greater quality of information.
21

The Hausman-Taylor estimation in Table C5 shows the negative impact on the medium-term credit when
the rule of law is used as an institutional measure. These findings suggest that the positive impact on
medium- and long-term credit arises primarily through the effect on long-term credit.

CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSION

This dissertation is an investigation into one of the important functions of the
banking system: to transform short-term liquid deposits into long-term illiquid financial
assets that can fund long gestation activities and, thus, raise the rate of economic growth.
Using a new data set on the maturity of bank credit to the private sector in 74 countries,
the dissertation shows that the extent to which banks perform their maturity
transformation function has an important effect on the relationship between the financial
system and economic growth. The dissertation shows that the availability of long-term
credit is particularly important, as economic growth is faster in countries where the
banking system extends more long-term credits. Bank credit maturity has a significant
effect on economic growth even after controlling for stock market as an alternative
source of long-term financing.
Furthermore, the dissertation shows that credit maturity depends on a number of
institutional and economic factors. Greater rule of law, low inflation, deeper financial
sector, and schemes for sharing of credit information between financial institutions
contribute to lengthening the maturity of bank credit. From a policy perspective, the
institutions for sharing credit information probably present the most interest because their
establishment is a policy choice. We show that such institutions can increase the
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effectiveness of credit in terms of economic growth by making it easier for financial
intermediaries to extend long-term credits.
The dissertation uses an additional data set on the maturity of bank credit to the
private sector in 14 transition countries. This data set provides several definitions of
maturity and allows for the investigation of the determinants of short-term credit, longterm credit, and very long-term credit. There are several additional interesting results
obtained using this data set. The results of rule of law, inflation, financial deepening, and
credit information sharing being significant determinants of credit maturity obtained in a
broad set of countries still hold. Furthermore, the additional results suggest that credit
maturity is longer in countries at the higher level of economic development, with less
liquid stock markets, and with more privately owned domestic banks. The results suggest
that credit information sharing mechanisms lengthen the maturity of credit if credit
information sharing institutions are privately owned or have greater quality of
information. Furthermore, the alternative institutional measures have robust effect on
maturity, similar to the one of rule of law.
The results presented in this dissertation are, to my knowledge, the first empirical
test of an important theoretical idea–that banks contribute to economic growth by
providing liquidity services. The dissertation provides an important missing link between
the theoretical and empirical literature on financial development and economic growth by
investigating a particular channel through which financial development affects economic
growth–an effort that is usually severely hampered by data availability.
Hopefully, future work can illuminate empirically the determinants of other
channels though which finance affects growth, e.g., by distinguishing between good and
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bad risk, by monitoring borrowers, by aggregating savings into large-size investments,
and by cross sectional risk diversification. Ideally, we would be able to compare the
channels through which finance affects growth in various institutional and economic
environments. We would also be able to investigate whether lax rule of law diminishes
the positive effect of credit on the economy because banks 1) cannot assess risk; 2)
monitor and influence the behavior of borrower; and/or as we show here 3) curtail longterm financing. We would be able to investigate how the relative importance of different
channels evolves as the financial system develops. In summary, investigating the
channels through which finance affects growth presents a number of exciting research
opportunities.
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APPENDIX A
GMM METHODOLOGY

Let yit be the logarithm of real per capita GDP in country i at time t. We are
interested in the following equation:

yi ,t − yi ,t −1 = (α − 1) yi ,t −1 + β ′ X i ,t + ηi + ε i ,t ,

(1)

where yi,t - yi,t-1 is the growth rate in real per capita GDP, Xi,t is a set of explanatory
variables, including our measures for financial development, η i captures unobserved
country-specific effects, and ε it is an error term. We rewrite equation (1) as:

yi ,t = α yi ,t −1 + β ′ X i ,t + ηi + ε i ,t ,

(2)

and take first differences to eliminate the country-specific effect, as it is correlated with
lagged dependent variable:

yi ,t − yi ,t −1 = α ( yi ,t −1 − yi ,t − 2 ) + β ′ ( X i ,t − X i ,t −1 ) + ( ε i ,t − ε i ,t −1 ) .

(3)

By construction, in equation (3), the lagged difference in per capita GDP is
correlated with the error term, which along with the potential endogeneity of the
explanatory variables X, requires the use of instruments. The GMM difference estimator
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uses the lagged levels of the explanatory variables as instruments under the conditions
that the error term is not serially correlated and that the lagged levels of the explanatory
variables are weakly exogenous (i.e.,, they are uncorrelated with future error terms). Then
the following moment conditions are used to calculate the difference estimator:

E ⎡⎣ yi ,t − s ( ε i ,t − ε i ,t −1 ) ⎤⎦ = 0 for s ≥ 2; t = 3,...., T ,

(4)

E ⎡⎣ X i ,t − s ( ε i ,t − ε i ,t −1 ) ⎤⎦ = 0 for s ≥ 2; t = 3,...., T .

(5)

Since persistence in the explanatory variables may adversely affect the smallsample and asymptotic properties of the difference estimator (Blundell and Bond 1998),
the difference estimator is further combined with an estimator in levels to produce a
system estimator. The inclusion of a levels equation also allows us to use information on
cross-country differences, which is not possible with the difference estimator alone.
The equation in levels uses the lagged differences of the explanatory variables as
instruments under two conditions. First, the error term is not serially correlated. Second,
although there may be correlation between the levels of the explanatory variables and the
case-specific error term, there is no correlation between the difference in the explanatory
variables and the error term. This yields the following stationarity properties:

E ⎡⎣ yi ,t + pηi ⎤⎦ = E ⎡⎣ yi ,t + qηi ⎤⎦ and E ⎡⎣ X i ,t + pηi ⎤⎦ = E ⎡⎣ X i ,t + qηi ⎤⎦ ∀ p and q.

(6)
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The additional moment conditions for the regression in levels are:

E ⎡⎣( yi ,t − s − yi ,t − s −1 )(ηi + ε i ,t ) ⎤⎦ = 0 for s = 1,

(7)

E ⎡⎣( X i ,t − s − X i ,t − s −1 )(ηi + ε i ,t ) ⎤⎦ = 0 for s = 1.

(8)

In summary, the GMM system estimator is obtained using the moment conditions
in equations (4), (5), (7), and (8). In addition, as Beck and Levine (2004), we use
alternative procedure developed by Calderon, Chong, and Loayza (2002) and Loayza,
Chong, and Calerdon (1999) to control for the over-fitting by reducing the dimensionality
of instruments. This procedure has one shortcoming: in order to perform it we loose one
time period from the sample. Nevertheless, given the sample size, we are still able to
make robust estimates.
As our data are constructed using overlapping averages, we need to adjust the
moving average component in the residuals. We do this by adjusting standard errors
according to Newey-West (1987) procedure, modified for the use in panel data. Petersen
(2007) points that, unlike for the single time series, in the panel data context the
weighting matrix is not necessary for the estimate of central term in covariance matrix to
be positive semi-definite. Nevertheless, we follow Newey-West approach assuming that
as the distance between observations goes to infinity, the correlation between residuals
approaches zero. Therefore, we use weighting matrix which multiplies the covariance of
lag l by (1 − ( l − 1) ( lmax + 1) ) , where lmax is the maximum lag order. Weighting matrix
with such elements will weigh heaviest the adjacent observation, while the weights
decrease as distance between observations increases. We adjust the dependence for up to
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five lags (i.e., we set lmax to 5) and estimate correlations only between lagged residuals in
the same cluster. As suggested by several papers, we have repeated the procedure by
including up to T-1 lags, where T is the maximum number of years per country, but doing
so leaves our standard errors almost unchanged. This procedure provides serialcorrelation and heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors.
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APPENDIX B
LIST OF COUNTRIES

Listed countries have been used in the estimations in chapter 3, while countries
with * have been used in estimations in chapter 4.
Albania *

Gabon

Nicaragua

Armenia

Georgia

Niger

Austria

Germany

Norway

Azerbaijan

Greece

Poland *

Bahamas, The

Guinea Bissau

Portugal

Bangladesh

Hungary *

Romania *

Belgium

Iceland

Russia

Benin

Ireland

Saudi Arabia

Bolivia

Italy

Senegal

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Ivory Coast

Serbia, Republic of *

Bulgaria *

Jordan

Singapore

Burkina

Kazakhstan

Slovak Republic *

Cameroon

Kyrgyz Republic

Slovenia *

Central African Republic

Latvia *

Spain

Chad

Lesotho

Sri Lanka

China

Lithuania *

Sweden

Congo

Luxembourg

Taiwan

Cyprus

Macau

Togo

Czech Republic *

Macedonia, FYR *

Tunisia

Denmark

Malaysia

Turkey

Equatorial Guinea

Mali

Ukraine *

Estonia *

Mongolia

United States

Finland

Mozambique

Uruguay

France

Netherlands, The

Yemen
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APPENDIX C
ADDITIONAL ESTIMATIONS

This appendix contains additional estimations from chapter 3 and chapter 4. Table
C1 presents results from the additional estimation techniques regarding the determinants
of credit maturity from chapter 3, as discussed in footnote 5. Tables C2 and C3 present
results from the additional estimation techniques regarding the determinants of credit
maturity, as discussed in footnote 18. Tables C4 and C5 present same set of results as in
Tables C2 and C3, but the dependent variables are, respectively, the portion of credit with
maturity of one year or less and the portion of credit with maturity from one year up to
(and including) five years.
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Table C1. Determinants of Credit Maturity – Additional Estimations

Rule of Law
Inflation
Growth
Credit
Income
Credit Information
Sharing
Banking Industry
Concentration
Stock Market
Turnover Ratio
Output Volatility
Manufacturing Share
of Output
U.K. Legal Origin
French Legal Origin
German Legal Origin
Socialist Legal Origin
Constant

Fixed Effects
(1)
(2)
5.607
4.431
(0.196) (0.515)
-3.985 -9.321
(0.014) (0.360)
0.268
0.249
(0.351) (0.248)
10.615 14.280
(0.000) (0.000)
0.684
0.457
(0.066) (0.268)
6.129
(0.002)
4.622
(0.427)
0.044
(0.951)
-0.864
(0.545)
-0.788
(0.082)

GLS
(3)
(4)
6.407 16.879
(0.000) (0.000)
-3.034 -27.937
(0.092) (0.000)
0.433 0.527
(0.003) (0.001)
11.748 9.896
(0.000) (0.000)
-0.073 -0.352
(0.429) (0.001)
4.072
(0.001)
4.147
(0.009)
0.492
(0.299)
5.362
(0.000)
-0.544
(0.000)
-8.452 -15.347
(0.038) (0.001)
-5.440 -10.414
(0.162) (0.016)
-0.223 -2.672
(0.955) (0.557)
9.951 13.151
(0.015) (0.006)
58.801 77.625 65.613 65.258
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)

χ2
(d.f.)
p-value

Hausman Test:
Observations
Countries

504
71

284
45

7.48 183.81
(5)
(10)
0.187 0.000
504
284
71
45

GLS – AR(1)
(5)
(6)
5.061 5.173
(0.000) (0.005)
-1.600 -6.242
(0.025) (0.323)
0.027 0.251
(0.762) (0.038)
10.758 14.238
(0.000) (0.000)
0.200 0.050
(0.104) (0.729)
4.060
(0.012)
2.907
(0.080)
1.152
(0.022)
0.777
(0.441)
-0.581
(0.000)
-10.670 -11.068
(0.022) (0.032)
-6.992 -8.857
(0.111) (0.051)
-1.164 2.929
(0.788) (0.514)
10.342 15.960
(0.027) (0.002)
64.472 74.863
(0.000) (0.000)
8.69
(5)
0.122
504
71

33.67
(10)
0.000
281
42

2SLS
(7)
(8)
3.008
5.291
(0.317) (0.152)
-3.892 -10.247
(0.000) (0.126)
0.257
0.362
(0.119) (0.109)
15.575 14.463
(0.000) (0.000)
-0.158 -0.210
(0.533) (0.437)
5.155
(0.017)
4.727
(0.181)
-0.085
(0.905)
0.382
(0.837)
-0.647
(0.022)

71.521 78.519
(0.000) (0.000)
19.22
(5)
0.001
504
71

9.43
(10)
0.492
284
45

Notes: See Table 1 for variable definitions. P-values are reported in parentheses below
coefficients. In 2SLS, legal origin dummies are used as instruments for endogenous credit.
Hausman test has a null hypothesis that explanatory variables are not correlated with the countryspecific random-effects. Credit, Banking Industry Concentration, Stock Market Turnover Ratio,
and Output Volatility enter the regression as log(variable), while Income is in thousands.
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Table C2. Percentage of Credit with Maturity Longer than One
Year (Additional Estimations)

Rule of Law
Inflation
Previous Year GDP Growth
Credit
Per Capita GDP
Credit Information Sharing
Banking Industry
Concentration
Stock Market Turnover
Output Volatility
State Banks’ Asset Share
Foreign Banks’ Asset Share

Fixed Effects
(1)
(2)
9.919
8.663
(0.016)
(0.015)
-1.164
-20.679
(0.843)
(0.061)
0.392
1.213
(0.019)
(0.000)
2.867
3.312
(0.060)
(0.039)
6.590
2.690
(0.000)
(0.045)
2.536
(0.010)
-4.134
(0.259)
-5.823
(0.009)
0.119
(0.682)
-0.254
(0.000)
-0.036
(0.095)

4.817
(0.019)
47.992
(0.000)

(4)
13.757
(0.000)
-53.893
(0.000)
1.535
(0.000)
9.605
(0.000)
-1.412
(0.001)
-0.128
(0.907)
4.680
(0.153)
-21.639
(0.000)
1.258
(0.001)
-0.404
(0.000)
-0.087
(0.001)
-5.148
(0.180)
63.263
(0.000)

Hausman-Taylor
(5)
(6)
9.577
8.905
(0.012) (0.009)
-1.660 -21.541
(0.642) (0.000)
0.401
1.236
(0.000) (0.000)
3.430
3.764
(0.008) (0.005)
6.028
2.122
(0.000) (0.036)
2.642
(0.024)
-3.587
(0.309)
-6.257
(0.042)
0.170
(0.537)
-0.264
(0.000)
-0.034
(0.129)
-18.219 -11.792
(0.138) (0.404)
44.253
57.806
(0.000) (0.000)

84.31 (5)
0.000
317
461
11
14

8.99 (11)
0.6232
317
11

0.22 (5) 1.05 (11)
0.989
0.999
461
317
14
11

EU Member
Constant

Hausman Test:
Observations
Countries

27.930
(0.000)
χ2 (d.f.)
p-value
461
14

47.115
(0.000)

GLS
(3)
3.474
(0.092)
-31.446
(0.000)
0.925
(0.000)
9.834
(0.000)
-1.006
(0.000)

Notes: See Table 7 for variable definitions. P-values are reported in parentheses below
coefficients. In the Hausman-Taylor estimation Credit is endogenous. Hausman test has a null
hypothesis that explanatory variables are not correlated with the country-specific random-effects.
Per Capita GDP is in thousands.
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Table C3. Percentage of Credit with Maturity Longer than Five
Years (Additional Estimations)

Rule of Law
Inflation
Previous Year GDP Growth
Credit
Per Capita GDP
Credit Information Sharing
Banking Industry
Concentration
Stock Market Turnover
Output Volatility
State Banks’ Asset Share
Foreign Banks’ Asset Share

Fixed Effects
(1)
(2)
12.583
10.508
(0.000)
(0.009)
-6.788
-15.085
(0.178)
(0.066)
-0.102
-0.080
(0.370)
(0.429)
2.136
2.572
(0.033)
(0.135)
13.930
16.551
(0.000)
(0.000)
-3.030
(0.004)
1.870
(0.535)
-8.744
(0.007)
-0.032
(0.918)
-0.109
(0.014)
-0.030
(0.174)

EU Member
Constant

Hausman Test:
Observations
Countries

-26.829
(0.000)
χ2 (d.f.)
p-value
278
10

-33.942
(0.000)

GLS
(3)
5.793
(0.066)
-1.696
(0.722)
0.872
(0.000)
7.823
(0.000)
5.378
(0.000)

-15.453
(0.000)
10.640
(0.010)

(4)
16.573
(0.000)
-18.562
(0.086)
0.786
(0.000)
7.423
(0.000)
3.496
(0.000)
5.513
(0.000)
6.347
(0.073)
-1.646
(0.767)
-0.029
(0.950)
-0.095
(0.023)
0.002
(0.951)
-5.722
(0.123)

40.90 (5)201.14 (11)
0.000
0.000
211
278
211
9
10
9

Hausman-Taylor
(5)
(6)
11.840
10.744
(0.001) (0.004)
-6.867 -14.898
(0.030) (0.048)
-0.084
-0.052
(0.531) (0.692)
2.419
3.208
(0.020) (0.021)
13.682
15.609
(0.000) (0.000)
-2.597
(0.019)
2.386
(0.439)
-8.758
(0.009)
-0.059
(0.861)
-0.113
(0.007)
-0.025
(0.242)
-35.417 -30.835
(0.060) (0.000)
8.485
(0.636)
1.33 (5) 0.37 (11)
0.931
1.000
278
211
10
9

Notes: See Table 7 for variable definitions. P-values are reported in parentheses below
coefficients. In the Hausman-Taylor estimation Credit is endogenous. Hausman test has a null
hypothesis that explanatory variables are not correlated with the country-specific random-effects.
Per Capita GDP is in thousands.
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Table C4. Percentage of Credit with Maturity of One Year or Less

Rule of Law
Inflation
Previous Year GDP Growth
Credit
Per Capita GDP
Credit Information Sharing
Banking Industry
Concentration
Stock Market Turnover
Output Volatility
State Banks’ Asset Share
Foreign Banks’ Asset Share

Fixed Effects
(1)
(2)
-9.919
-8.663
(0.016)
(0.015)
1.164
20.679
(0.843)
(0.061)
-0.392
-1.213
(0.019)
(0.000)
-2.867
-3.312
(0.060)
(0.039)
-6.590
-2.690
(0.000)
(0.045)
-2.536
(0.010)
4.134
(0.259)
5.823
(0.009)
-0.119
(0.682)
0.254
(0.000)
0.036
(0.095)

-4.817
(0.019)
52.008
(0.000)

(4)
-13.757
(0.000)
53.893
(0.000)
-1.535
(0.000)
-9.605
(0.000)
1.412
(0.001)
0.128
(0.907)
-4.680
(0.153)
21.639
(0.000)
-1.258
(0.001)
0.404
(0.000)
0.087
(0.001)
5.148
(0.180)
36.737
(0.000)

Hausman-Taylor
(5)
(6)
-9.577
-8.905
(0.012) (0.009)
1.660
21.541
(0.642) (0.000)
-0.401
-1.236
(0.000) (0.000)
-3.430
-3.764
(0.008) (0.005)
-6.028
-2.122
(0.000) (0.036)
-2.642
(0.024)
3.587
(0.309)
6.257
(0.042)
-0.170
(0.537)
0.264
(0.000)
0.034
(0.129)
18.219
11.792
(0.138) (0.404)
55.747
42.194
(0.000) (0.002)

84.31 (5)
0.000
317
461
11
14

8.99 (11)
0.623
317
11

0.22 (5) 1.05 (11)
0.998
0.999
461
317
14
11

EU Member
Constant

Hausman Test:
Observations
Countries

72.070
(0.000)
χ2 (d.f.)
p-value
461
14

52.885
(0.000)

GLS
(3)
-3.474
(0.092)
31.446
(0.000)
-0.925
(0.000)
-9.834
(0.000)
1.006
(0.000)

Notes: See Table 7 for variable definitions. P-values are reported in parentheses below
coefficients. In the Hausman-Taylor estimation Credit is endogenous. Hausman test has a null
hypothesis that explanatory variables are not correlated with the country-specific random-effects.
Per Capita GDP is in thousands.
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Table C5. Percentage of Credit with Maturity from One Year
up to (and Including) Five Years

Rule of Law
Inflation
Previous Year GDP Growth
Credit
Per Capita GDP
Credit Information Sharing
Banking Industry
Concentration
Stock Market Turnover
Output Volatility
State Banks’ Asset Share
Foreign Banks’ Asset Share

Fixed Effects
(1)
(2)
-14.670
-10.568
(0.000)
(0.000)
-9.284
-51.884
(0.214)
(0.000)
0.538
0.406
(0.000)
(0.001)
-4.518
-2.215
(0.000)
(0.066)
-2.726
-7.475
(0.000)
(0.000)
3.696
(0.000)
-2.064
(0.376)
2.624
(0.322)
0.407
(0.218)
-0.158
(0.000)
-0.117
(0.000)

EU Member
Constant

Hausman Test:
Observations
Countries

51.265
(0.000)
χ2 (d.f.)
p-value
278
10

79.467
(0.000)

GLS
(3)
7.429
(0.006)
-25.051
(0.000)
0.636
(0.000)
-2.567
(0.000)
-6.053
(0.000)

8.335
(0.001)
47.325
(0.000)

(4)
5.235
(0.028)
-95.924
(0.000)
0.319
(0.026)
-2.533
(0.000)
-5.906
(0.000)
-2.984
(0.001)
-4.137
(0.117)
5.414
(0.201)
2.202
(0.000)
-0.391
(0.000)
-0.241
(0.000)
84.248
(0.000)

243.33(5) 636.96 (11)
0.000
0.000
211
278
211
9
10
9

Hausman-Taylor
(5)
(6)
-14.015 -10.348
(0.000) (0.002)
-9.322 -52.583
(0.000) (0.000)
0.537
0.384
(0.000) (0.001)
-4.643
-2.836
(0.000) (0.015)
-2.669
-6.640
(0.001) (0.000)
3.238
(0.001)
-2.491
(0.349)
2.733
(0.346)
0.457
(0.118)
-0.158
(0.000)
-0.124
(0.000)
27.972
74.932
(0.021) (0.000)
22.602
(0.052)
1.23 (5) 2.31 (11)
0.942
0.997
278
211
10
9

Notes: See Table 7 for variable definitions. P-values are reported in parentheses below
coefficients. In the Hausman-Taylor estimation Credit is endogenous. Hausman test has a null
hypothesis that explanatory variables are not correlated with the country-specific random-effects.
Per Capita GDP is in thousands.
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